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Abstract 
Many people find their first employment in a low wage job. Others accept low wage jobs 
after a period out of the workforce or unemployed. An issue of vital social interest is the 
speed with which low wage workers move on to better jobs. This review of the 
international literature finds that the extent of mobility depends on the definition of low 
wage, and that the least upwardly mobile are older, less educated workers, including 
middle aged women, sole mothers and men who have been retrenched. Young, educated, 
urban workers quickly move to better paid jobs. Everywhere, women are more likely to be 
low paid than men, and have lower mobility. Higher education reduces the risk of low pay, 
but not to zero. 
The paper goes on to examine the extent and sources of wage mobility, and looks 
carefully at the question of whether a low wage job can be assumed to be preferable to no 
job (and finds that it cannot). It finds that countries with high levels of wage inequality have 
lower levels of wage mobility. It concludes with a discussion of possible policy steps that 
could reduce the risk of people being stuck in low wage jobs for long periods. These 
should be targeted at both the demand side (the structure of jobs) and the supply side (the 
capacity of workers).  
   
JEL CLASSIFICATION  J30 – Wages, Compensation and Labour Costs - General  
J60 – Mobility, Unemployment and Vacancies – General 
 
KEYWORDS  Low wages; mobility; work and welfare; low wage workers. 
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Low Wage Jobs and Pathways to 
Better Outcomes 
1 Introduction 
This paper reviews the current state knowledge on the role played by low wage jobs in 
providing access to and progression in employment for low skill workers.  In particular, it 
addresses a number of questions: 
•  the extent to which low pay jobs provide the first step on the ladder to reasonably paid 
and reasonably secure jobs for low skill workers; 
•  conversely, the extent to which low skill workers become stuck in low paid and 
insecure work; 
•  what are the characteristics of people who are employed in low wage jobs; 
•  which types of low paid jobs provide the best/worst chances of upward mobility; 
•  whether a low paid, insecure job is better than no job; 
•  whether low skill/low pay jobs can coexist with high skill/high pay jobs for similar work; 
•  the extent to which the costs of geographical mobility and broken employment 
histories inhibit wage mobility and why; 
•  whether the supply of low skilled/high skilled workers affects the demand for low 
skilled/high skilled workers; 
•  Whether different causes of low skill (low education, poor schooling or parenting, 
history on welfare, crime, drug dependence etc) affect future labour market outcomes. 
Most attention has been paid to research based on the US, the UK and other parts of the 
English-speaking world. However, conclusions from the experience of continental Europe 
are also referred to, particularly because they differ in some respects from the Anglo 
experience.  
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1.1  Are low wage jobs a problem? 
In the English-speaking world, the general growth in prosperity that has occurred over the 
last two decades has benefited some groups much more than others. Indeed for some, 
the decades did not look prosperous at all. Two groups that have not done well are youth 
and low wage workers.  
At the beginning of the 21
st Century, it is a daunting task for many young people to 
negotiate the essential step for the transition to adult independence, namely to find 
adequately paid and adequately secure employment. Recent decades have seen a 
collapse in the number of full-time jobs available for teenagers and even those in their 
early 20s. Unemployment remains particularly high for this age group. Young people are 
expected to have levels of formal education that are much higher than the historical norm, 
and it is clear that for some the formal education system does not work very well. For 
those not in full-time education or employment, the norm is bits and pieces of part-time 
work, paid at low wages, unemployment or non-employment. It is an important social 
issue to know whether young people who start their adult work lives in this way have good 
prospects of subsequently moving on to full-time and reasonably paid and secure 
employment. Or are they likely to be trapped in a future marred by low earnings, 
unemployment and periodic reliance on the welfare system?  
The role played by low wage jobs in the pathway to work for low education youth has 
particular social significance. But low wage jobs are also taken by other people in the 
labour force. The two main such groups are women re-entering paid employment after an 
absence to care for children, and higher wage workers who lose their jobs. There is much 
more written about the first of these than about the second two, but we will report what we 
can find on the latter groups. 
English-speaking countries more broadly have seen a substantial growth in the proportion 
of jobs that are some combination of low paid, casual and part-time. There is 
understandable interest in whether this growth should be a cause of concern for policy-
makers and the community. The growth of such jobs will be of most concern if they are 
dead-end, such that the people who occupy them stay in the same sorts of jobs for 
lengthy periods of time, and leave them largely because they leave the workforce rather 
than because they find substantially better jobs. If this is the norm, then there is a real risk 
that the growth of such jobs will generate an underclass of people and families who have 
to deal for long periods, possibly a lifetime, with poverty and insecurity.  
The growth of low paid, and in other ways unrewarding, jobs is of less concern if they 
provide the first foot on the employment ladder for people who come to the labour force 
with few employable skills. In this scenario, low skill new entrants work for some period in 
low paid jobs and in doing so learn specific job skills and the general attributes of 
productive workers. The low pay is in effect compensated for by on-the-job learning, and 
after a period the workers move on to better paid and more secure employment. In 
another version of this story, people who take low paid and insecure jobs are doing so to 
earn an income while they study full-time. At the end of their study, they go on to 
satisfactory employment in better jobs. In either case, we can view the employment as 
providing a combination of current wage and skills development that will lead to enhanced 
future wages.  
There is clearly immense social and policy interest in which of these two scenarios is 
closest to the truth. In reality, both experiences occur and the main empirical task is to  
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identify the relative size of each and who is in each group. A second important task is to 
understand the scope for policy to improve the outcomes for low wage workers. The 
outcomes at issue could be the current level of wages and security, or it could be the 
amount and type of employment skills learned, or some combination. 
If all low wage jobs were simply an episode in people’s lives, from which they moved to 
better jobs, would such jobs still be a public policy concern? There are two reasons for 
thinking that the answer to this question is yes.  
The first is that even in the short run, people need an income that is sufficient to meet 
basic needs. Just what constitutes basic needs is controversial, but this does not mean 
that the concept is empty. As articulated in Rerum Novarum, the papal encyclical of 1891: 
... there is a dictate of Nature more imperious and ancient than any bargain between 
man and man, that the remuneration must be enough to support the wage-earner in 
reasonable and frugal comfort. If through necessity or fear of a worse evil, the 
workman accepts harder conditions because an employer or contractor will give him 
no better, he is the victim of force and injustice.  
The concept (and language) of “frugal comfort” was adopted as the foundation of the first 
basic wage in Australia, in 1907. In adopting “frugal comfort” as its test of a just wage, 
Rerum Novarum most probably had in mind that it was earned by an adult male, with little 
prospect of significant upward mobility. But even in the short term people must be paid 
enough to enable them to meet the essential bills. Just what are the essential bills will 
depend on their circumstances, and it is here that information on who are the low wage 
workers is relevant. The necessary minimum will be lower for young people living at home 
than for an adult who is supporting dependent children, for example.  
The second basis for worrying about the level of low wages is also made clear in Rerum 
Novarum, and is equally relevant today. If a worker is paid less than is necessary to 
provide for a level of frugal comfort, then she or he is the victim of force and injustice. 
Modern nations have a notion of what is a fair wage and this notion is related to the levels 
of living of the time and place in which the worker lives. 
1.2 Policy  issues 
As Amartya Sen observed, market outcomes can be both perfectly efficient and perfectly 
disgusting. In an acknowledgement of the risks that labour market outcomes may be 
disgusting, all developed economies regulate their labour markets, to a greater or lesser 
degree. These regulations are mostly directed toward providing some limits to the 
harshness of the terms on which people may be employed. They include minimum wages, 
prescribed ordinary hours of work, unfair dismissal rules and other forms of job protection, 
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex, race and regulation of the terms of 
industrial conflict.  Here, we present a set of policy questions in order to provide a context 
and focus for the literature review that is to come. 
1.2.1  Low wages and current material well-being 
If people are paid low wages, their capacity to support themselves and any dependents is 
low. The policy issues are a) is the standard of living of low wage workers acceptable? 
And b) is the level of the wage in low wage jobs fair?  
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Clearly, if people are employed in low wage jobs for only a small proportion of their 
working lives, then the terms of that employment will have only a minor impact on their 
lifetime material well-being. This does not make those terms irrelevant. But it does reduce 
their social significance. In judging whether wages are too low to provide a decent 
standard of living, the household circumstances of low wage workers are relevant. Many 
workers live with other people, and share income and responsibilities. It is important to 
know the extent to which low wage workers a) rely solely on their own earnings, b) 
support dependents from their own earnings, and c) share in the housing and income 
provided by other family members. 
If low wages are judged to be inadequate to support a decent standard of living, several 
policy responses are possible. These include: 
•  legislate or arbitrate higher minimum wages 
•  use the tax/transfer system to increase the disposable incomes of low wage workers 
in low income families 
•  provide in-kind support for low income (or for all) low wage workers (eg, subsidised 
childcare, healthcare, transport) 
•  force up the market wage, by reducing the supply of low wage labour, eg, by 
providing an alternative welfare income or by increasing the school leaving age, or by 
restricting immigration of low skill workers, or by supporting the education of low skill 
workers, or by mandating forms and quantities of training to be provided by 
employers 
•  force up the market wage, by increasing the demand for low wage labour, eg, by 
directly employing low wage workers in the supply of publicly provided goods and 
services, or by subsidising the employment of low wage workers by the private sector, 
or by reducing the non-wage costs of employing low wage labour (such as payroll 
taxes and workers’ compensation premiums). 
In the English-speaking world, there is strong evidence that unemployed people are much 
more likely to be poor than are low wage workers (eg, Harding and Richardson, 1999). It 
is important for policy makers to know the terms of the trade-off between low wages and 
jobs for low skilled workers. How elastic is the demand for low wage labour? Does the 
gain in reducing poverty that would be made by increasing low wages exceed the cost 
that would be incurred from any increase in unemployment? In thinking about this trade-
off, it is essential to know whether low wage employment is a transitory state or likely to 
be endured over many years. It is this last issue that is the focus of this review. If steps 
can be taken to increase mobility out of low wage jobs, then the pressure to protect the 
standard of living of low wage workers, through regulating the wages and conditions of 
their employment, is reduced.  
1.2.2  Low wages and lifetime material well-being 
Low wages are clearly much more damaging if people spend a large period of their 
working lives in such jobs. This is especially true for workers who rely primarily on their 
own earnings for their standard of living (ie, are not the secondary earner in the 
household).  
The policy issues that surround long term low wage employment are centred on two 
questions. The first is an empirical one: what proportion of low wage workers stay in such 
jobs for extended periods of time (and who are they?). Second, what steps can 
governments take to increase mobility from low wage jobs to higher paid jobs? The first of  
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these we will report on in some detail. The steps available to policy can be grouped as a) 
skills development and b) job matching. 
Theory and evidence both suggest that a common pathway from low to higher wages is 
through the acquisition of improved workforce skills. These may be acquired in formal 
educational settings, or on the job. Governments can influence the acquisition of 
additional skills through: 
•  the infrastructure of formal education (school, vocational, higher), with an emphasis 
on the requirements and outcomes of the least skilled 
•  the encouragement of comprehensive structured training that integrates off-the-job 
and on-the-job learning 
•  the provision of tailored assistance for the transition from school to work for those at 
risk of long term labour market disadvantage 
•  the provision of second chance education and skills development, for older workers, 
with attention given to different learning styles and to the needs of people who have 
found formal education a bad experience 
•  active encouragement of a culture of training among firms, perhaps supported by tax 
incentives 
•  ensuring that there is a reasonable payoff to the acquisition of skills, in terms of the 
probability of getting a job and the rewards for doing so. 
Theory and evidence also suggest that a second important source of upward wage 
mobility is through workers finding a job that provides a better match for the abilities that 
they have to offer. It is costly to both firm and worker to search for the best match of job 
requirements and worker abilities. Governments can take active steps to assist the 
matching process. The provision of information to both sides of the market is key. 
Information on housing as well as job prospects will assist geographical mobility, while 
more active assistance is likely to be valuable for some low wage workers.  
1.3  Outline of what is to follow 
In the rest of this review, we commence with a brief summary of the major developments 
in the international economy that have been affecting low wage jobs and workers. We 
then define low wages, and describe who occupies low wage jobs and where they work. 
In order to understand this pattern of low wage employment, we examine first why firms 
would want to pay low wages, and second, why people would accept employment in low 
wage jobs. This includes the question of whether a low wage job is better than no job, for 
low skilled workers. We then turn to the big question: What is the extent, nature and 
change in wage mobility, and who are the mobile/immobile? This is followed by a 
discussion of strategies by which to exit low wage jobs into higher paid jobs. We provide a 
brief discussion of the important topic of whether the supply of low skilled people has an 
identifiable impact on the demand for low wage workers. We conclude with an overview of 
the evidence and a discussion of its implications for policy in the New Zealand context. 
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2  The context of low wage work 
2.1  The economic environment 
There have been major social and economic changes over recent decades, a number of 
which have had adverse effects on the economic prospects of low wage workers and of 
youth. These changes include technological innovation, that evidence now strongly 
suggests has enhanced the productivity of high skill workers substantially more than the 
productivity of low skill workers. They include also greater integration of world financial 
and product markets. This has favoured internationally mobile factors of production, 
including highly skilled workers and capital, at the expense of immobile factors of 
production, including low skill workers. It has also, in effect, increased the supply of low 
skilled labour for the production of traded goods and services, thus depressing the relative 
price of such labour in the developed countries. Government policies to deregulate labour 
markets, to reduce the role of government in the economy and to increase the role of 
market-based competition in the delivery of services have amplified the effects of 
technological change and globalisation on the changes in the labour market. Acemoglu 
(2002) provides a comprehensive examination of the relative contributions of 
technological change, international trade and institutional change in causing the rise in 
wage inequality in the US. He (and many others) gives the greatest weight to skill-biased 
technological change. 
In a parallel movement, both demand and supply forces have combined to reduce the size 
of the manufacturing sector and expand the size of the services sector in the developed 
economies. Different skills and attributes are in general required to produce services 
compared with manufactured goods, and this has changed the composition of demand for 
skills. The demand for technical and manual skills has fallen while the demand for 
interactive, cognitive and customer skills has risen.  
Each of the developments described above has made it harder for low skill people to find 
and keep decent jobs. The combined impact of these developments has amplified the 
effects of each one taken on its own. Two of the hardest hit groups are low skill people 
generally (especially men) and workers who are outside the “prime age” band—both 
young and older.  
2.2  Developments in the wage structure and low wage 
work 
English-speaking countries have had similar developments in their wage structures over 
the past 25 years. While the trends have been the same, the degree of change has been 
different. The changes have generally been most marked in the United States, followed by 
the UK. They have been more muted in Canada, and particularly in Australia. The 
European OECD countries have had a more varied experience. For ease of exposition 
(and because they have been the most extensively examined), we here summarise the 
main developments in the US. 
•  Wage inequality has risen substantially since the early 1970s for both men and 
women full-time employees, with particularly fast growth in wages occurring at the 
very top.  
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•  Real wages for men fell over the two decade period to the mid-1990s, with the lowest 
wage earners losing the most (up to 30% of the value of the real wage). 
•  Increased cross-section wage inequality has not been offset by a rise in wage mobility 
over time or a compression in non-wage benefits, so that longer term inequalities 
have also risen. 
•  Wage differentials by education, occupation and age have all increased, but the 
gender differential has decreased. At the same time, wage inequality within age, 
education, sex and occupation groups has risen. 
•  Since the mid-1990s, real wages have increased their rate of growth and all points on 
the wage distribution have benefited.  
The rise in inequality in the wage structure in the US has been dramatic and has 
translated into a substantial rise in the inequality of household incomes and in 
consumption. For lower skill men, there has also been a fall in employment and in the 
value of the real wage. This has occurred while the overall levels of education have risen 
considerably. Bernstein and Hartmann (1999), for example, report that men who had not 
completed secondary school had real hourly wages that were on average 30% lower in 
1997 than in 1973. The comparable figure for women was 3% lower. Both men and 
women who had completed secondary school but not done post school education had 
falls in their real hourly wage of 16%. Over the 32 year period ending in 1995, the real 
weekly wage for men in the bottom 30% of the wage distribution fell up to 5%.  The higher 
the wage, the faster the wage growth. The ratio of the wages of fully employed men at the 
90
th percentile to that of men at the 10
th percentile of the wage distribution rose from 3.3 in 
1963 to 4.7 in 1995. (Katz and Autor, 1999:1468,1471,1475). 
Table 1 shows the considerable difference in the course of male wage inequality across 
the OECD. The big increases for the US and UK stand out (followed by the increase for 
New Zealand). Austria, France, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands 
by contrast have had only small rises in inequality, or even a fall in the case of Norway 
and Germany.  
These patterns are suggestive of an important role of differences and changes in 
labor market institutions and regulations in explaining the cross-country divergence of 
wage structure changes in 1980s and 1990s – And the existence of either a decline in 
the relative wages of the less skilled, a sharp rise in the unemployment of the less 
skilled, or both in almost all OECD countries over the past two decades despite 
expanding relative supplies of highly educated workers is strongly suggestive of a 
common shift in labor demand against the less skilled. 
Katz and Autor, 1999:1503-4. 
There is widespread agreement among labour economists that one aspect of “labor 
market institutions and regulations” that has an impact on wage inequality is the level and 
enforcement of a minimum wage. There is clear evidence for the US, UK, Australia, New 
Zealand and several European countries that changes in the level of minimum wages are 
directly inversely correlated with the level of wage inequality. Where the real value of 
minimum wages has been allowed to fall, overall wage inequality has risen: the more 
minimum wages have fallen, the more inequality has risen. (Blau and Kahn, 1999:1434; 
Keese, Puymoyen and Swain, 1998:235).  
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Table 1 - Trends in wage inequality for men employed full-time, selected OECD 
countries, 1979-94 
  1979 1989 1994 Change  from 
earliest to 
latest year 
Australia  2.7 2.8 2.9  0.20 
Austria 2.6  2.7    0.08 
Canada  3.5 4.0 3.8  0.33 
Finland  2.4 2.6 2.5  0.10 
France  3.4 3.5 3.4  0.03 
Germany  2.3 2.2 2.2  -0.10 
Italy  2.3 2.2 2.6  0.34 
Japan  2.6 2.9 2.8  0.19 
Netherlands  na 2.6 2.6  -0.03 
New  Zealand  na 3.1 3.2  0.09 
Norway  2.1 2.2 2.0  -0.08 
Sweden  2.1 2.2 2.2  0.09 
UK  2.5 3.1 3.2  0.76 
US  3.2 4.0 4.3  1.07 
Note: Ratio of wage of 90th percentile earner to 10th percentile earner 
Source: Katz and Autor, 1999:1503 
As Figure 1 shows, the upper earnings limit (expressed in PPP $US) of full-time workers 
in the 10
th and 20
th percentiles of the wage distribution do not vary a great deal across a 
range of OECD countries. Low wage workers are paid particularly well in Switzerland, 
Germany and the Netherlands, but there are only small differences among the remaining 
countries. New Zealand low wage workers have the lowest wages of those reported.  
There is much greater variety in the extent of low wage employment among the OECD 
countries than in the level of wages of low paid workers. Figure 2 shows the proportion of 
full-time workers in a range of OECD countries who were, in the mid-1990s, receiving less 
than two-thirds of median earnings. The proportion varies from a high of 25% for the US to 
a low of 5% for Sweden. It is notable that it is English-speaking countries (and Japan) that 
have a high incidence of low pay. This includes New Zealand, with 16% of its full time 
workers earning less than two thirds of median earnings  
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Figure 1 - Low earnings of full-time workers 1994: annual gross earnings, 






















Source: Keese, Puymoyen and Swaim, 1998:225 















Source: OECD 1997:48. Low earnings are defined as less than two thirds of median full-time earnings. Data are for full-time workers. 
2.3  Implications for upward wage mobility 
There is a growing literature on the phenomenon of a so-called “skills-biased” 
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widened the wage gap between the low-skilled/low-paid and the highly-skilled/well-paid 
employees. That is, low wage jobs pay less than they used to in real terms and relative to 
the average. This real decline in the low skills wage could be due to changes in the 
characteristics of the low skills jobs and workers, or to a fall in the returns to low-skills 
jobs. If the latter, it suggests that the proportion of non-training jobs has risen. Gregg and 
Wadsworth (2000) argue that there has been a widening gap between the pay levels of 
entry level jobs and other jobs in Britain. Further, this is attributable to the characteristics 
of, and not the rewards to, low-skills jobs and low skilled workers. They conclude that 
there has been “---a simple decline of [the pay of] entry jobs in the distribution of all jobs 
unrelated to observable characteristics and returns to those characteristics.” (p 516). 
It is important to appreciate that, in the English-speaking world and especially in the US, 
the rise in the gap between the wages of low skilled workers and high skilled (educated) 
workers has arisen in large part because of the fall in the wages of the less 
skilled/educated. One reason for this is, as Gregg and Wadsworth identify, that the 
average ability of young people with low levels of education is most likely falling. As the 
average levels of education of a cohort rise, those who are left behind (drop out of school) 
are not a random sample of the group. They are those who for a variety of reasons do not 
find formal education beneficial.  
While technological change might have been increasing the productivity of high skill 
workers more than that of low skill workers, demand for each has grown at a comparable 
pace. That is, technological and other changes have not seen low wage jobs disappear: to 
the contrary, they have grown in proportion to the high paying jobs, at the expense of 
middle-paying jobs. This phenomenon has been referred to as the “disappearing middle”.  
Freeman (1998), among others, gives evidence of what he called a “bifurcated growth” of 
employment in the US. This uneven growth is evident in both occupations and industries, 
with both high-wage services and low-wage services growing faster than any other 
industry group in the US.  The US Bureau of Labor Statistics forecasts that of the ten jobs 
expected to provide the largest jobs growth to 2006, seven of them require only “short-
term on-the-job training” as the required skill. They include retail salespersons, truck 
drivers, home health, teaching and nursing aides, and receptionists and information 
clerks. The other three jobs with expected fast employment growth are at the high skills 
end, requiring at least a college degree. The seven low skilled jobs (and there are many 
others like them also forecast to expand their share of employment) do not require much 
skill to perform and do not provide promotion ladders. It is most unlikely that workers who 
stay in these jobs would benefit from much skills development or wage mobility.   
Furthermore, this phenomenon seems to be generalised among OECD countries. If this 
trend continues, the fears of a low-wage/low-skills trap for individuals may prove both well 
founded and worsening over time, as it would be harder to cross the ever-widening hollow 
middle to make it to the high-wage end.  
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3  What are low wages? 
Berstein and Hartman (1999:28) provide a very useful summary of what constitutes the 
low wage labour market. They observe that there are two approaches to characterising 
this market.  
Job-based definitions identify a set of jobs characterised by low wages, few benefits, 
and little upward mobility. Worker-based definitions are typically based on a worker’s 
absolute or relative hourly wage, earnings (wages times hours worked), or educational 
level. Job-based definitions provide the theoretical foundation and worker-based 
definitions, the empirical basis for study of the low-wage labor market.  
The job-based approach is strongly associated with the concept of segmented labour 
markets. Segmented labour market theory argues that there is not a single market where 
people are smoothly allocated to whatever job best matches their abilities, and paid 
accordingly. Rather, there are two distinct markets. The primary market has well paid jobs, 
with reasonable levels of security and opportunities for skill development and 
advancement. The secondary market, in contrast, comprises low paid jobs that are often 
insecure, have few fringe benefits or promotion possibilities and little opportunity for 
workers to improve their skills and wages. A key element of the concept of segmented 
labour markets is that it is difficult for workers to move from the secondary market to the 




The extent to which the concept of a segmented labour market is illuminating remains 
controversial in economics. It is difficult to find good empirical data on the features that 
are distinctive to this view of the labour market. In this review, we focus on the worker-
based definition of the low wage labour market. We discuss later the extent to which low 
wage workers are indeed stuck in low wage jobs. But we do not consider, as does 
segmented labour market theory, the roles of discrimination and other systemic features in 
trapping people into low wage jobs. 
The definition of what constitutes a low wage is arbitrary. The choice made is important 
because it substantially affects both the numbers and characteristics of low wage workers.  
There are three broad approaches to defining a low wage. The first enquires into the 
minimum earnings needed to ensure that an individual or family of defined composition is 
able to live at an acceptable standard of living. This was the approach adopted by Justice 
HB Higgins when he determined the first basic, or minimum, wage in Australia in 1907. 
The difficulty with this approach is in determining an acceptable standard of living for a 
full-time worker and his/her family. Of course, a given wage will deliver a different material 
living standard to families of different size and composition, so a wage that is adequate for 
a single young person may not provide an acceptable income for a family of five. These 
are some of the compelling difficulties that have caused the Australian Industrial Relations 
                                                                 
1 Berstein and Hartman (1999) believe that the notion of segmented labour markets (along with the idea of wage contours) is 
illuminating and important to a richer understanding of low wage labour markets. These two concepts “provide a compelling conceptual 
structure within which to understand the low-wage labor market.   They offer a rich model of the determinants of wages and 
employment, which, unlike traditional labor market theory, can incorporate the role of labor market institutions (such as unions, 
minimum wage legislation, and international trading regimes), along with established power dynamics (such as race- and gender-
based discrimination).” p 30.  
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Commission to abandon the attempt to identify a “living wage” in recent decisions that set 
minimum wages. 
A second approach to defining a low wage is to relate it to administratively-set 
expressions of what constitutes a low but acceptable income. This might be a legislated 
minimum wage, or some multiple of a selected social welfare payment, such as an old 
age pension. Such an approach enables the researcher to avoid imposing his or her own 
interpretation of what is a low income, and to substitute instead that determined by the 
parliament or some agent of government. The drawbacks with this approach are twofold. 
If the minimum wage is used, it will often be the case that only a small number of people 
(especially adults) are actually receiving this rate. If some multiple of a social welfare 
benefit is used, then the choice of multiple (to reflect the disutility of work) becomes as 
arbitrary as selecting a minimum acceptable standard of living. 
The third approach defines a low wage as some fraction of the median wage. Again, the 
choice of fraction is arbitrary. Two-thirds of the median full-time wage is a frequently used 
figure. This makes low wages a relative concept – there is no direct relation with the ability 
to purchase some minimum basket of goods and services. A related, even more relative, 
approach is to take the wage that defines the bottom quintile or decile of wage earners. If 
a given percentile is used to define low wages then it follows that the proportion of the 
workforce that is employed on a low wage cannot change.  
When choosing among these options, it is useful to select a measure that is widely used, 
in order to facilitate comparisons across countries and studies. Two-thirds of the median 
wage of a full-time worker is probably the most widely used measure, but the empirical 
work to be reported below is not uniform in the definition adopted. The two-thirds median 
was adopted by the European Commission Working Group on Equitable Wages. It has 
the advantage of being somewhat above the minimum wage of most countries, which 
means that a non-trivial number of workers will be encompassed within the definition. It 
should be noted that the conclusions about who is a low paid worker, and the degree of 
mobility in and out of this state, are somewhat sensitive to the choice of low wage. 
Specifically, levels of mobility are higher, the lower is the value of the wage chosen. So is 
the proportion who are youth.  
People can have low earnings because they are not employed full-time - working for only 
a fraction of the normal working week or only a fraction of the normal number of weeks in 
the year. There is also quite a deal of short term volatility in the level of wages earned, 
especially among new entrants to the labour force. It is preferable to include as low wage 
workers only those who have persistently low weekly earnings, arising from a low hourly 
wage. People with low wages have low earnings, but people with low earnings do not 
necessarily have low wages. They may be receiving quite reasonable wages, but 
voluntarily or involuntarily, be working less than a normal working week or year. We 
therefore mostly exclude from consideration the issue of low earnings, as distinct from low 
wages. 
The links between low wages, low earnings and low standard of living are set out in Figure 
3, below.  
Low wages will lead to low earnings. But people who have adequate wages may also 
have low earnings, if they work a sufficiently small number of hours per week or per year. 
People with low earnings may in turn have a low standard of living. But it is quite possible, 
and indeed common, that they do not. The link between the level of earnings and the 
standard of living is indirect, because people mostly live in families where resources are  
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shared. If the low wage/low earnings worker lives with one or more others who have 
adequate earnings, then his or her standard of living is likely to be quite adequate. We 
show a dotted link between adequate earnings and low standard of living. People who 
have adequate (or not-low) earnings may have a low standard of living, if they or their 
family have particularly high expenditure needs (such as a large number of dependent 
children, or family members with a disability). 
The relationships illustrated in Figure 3 may hold at the current time (eg, for a week, 
month or year) or they may hold over a more extended period. The major policy concern 
with low wages is that people can have a low standard of living for many years, caused by 
low earnings, that are in turn caused by low wages. This is a sub-set of the people who at 
any moment of time have low wages, and is not the whole cause of a low standard of 
living. 
There is some empirical work that examines the link between the relationships set out in 
Figure 3.  
Figure 3 - The relation between low wages, low earnings and low standard of living 
 
Savage (1999) quotes a study by Dixon for New Zealand that finds that about one quarter 
of low wage earners live in households that are in the bottom third of the household 
income distribution (p 8).  Richardson (1998) and Richardson and Harding (1999) 
conclude that, for Australia, while the majority of low wage workers do not live in low 
income households, a sizeable minority does. Again, the experience is not homogeneous. 
“There are indeed people who earn low wages who also live in comfortable middle and 
upper income households. There are also low-wage workers who support dependent 
children and who struggle on low incomes.” (Richardson, 1998:576-7). For Ireland, Nolan 
(1998) finds that while 24% of full-time employees are low-paid (earn less than two-thirds 
of the Irish median gross weekly earnings), as few as 6 and 13% of them live in 
households below half and 60% of average equivalent income, respectively. These 
proportions of equivalent incomes are commonly used as poverty lines. However, the  
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overwhelming majority of full-time employees in poor households (as many as 90% in the 
UK) are low paid. So while the experience of poverty implies being low paid for people 
who are full-time workers, the reverse is often not true. Similar outcomes are found in the 
United States (eg,  see Burkhauser and Finegan, 1993). 
In exploring the link between low wages and low standard of living, the OECD (1997:12) 
observes that there is a high positive correlation, across countries, between the incidence 
of low paid employment and the proportion of people living in low income households. 
They report that while in most European countries, 10% or fewer of full-time low wage 
workers live in poor households (ie, with an income of less than half the average adjusted 
household income), in the US the comparable figure is about 25%.   
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4  Who are the low wage workers? 
Most research in this area concentrates on new entrants who are young. Youth comprise 
only a portion of low skill workers. In brief, people move into low wage jobs from the 
education system, from being outside the labour force for other reasons, from 
unemployment and from higher wage jobs. People move out of low wage jobs into 
unemployment, out of the labour force, and into higher wage jobs. We define upward 
mobility only as movement into a higher wage job. “Stability” obviously includes staying in 
a low wage job. But it also will be defined to include moving to unemployment or out of the 
labour force. 
The OECD (1997:7) observes that “While the overall incidence of low pay varies 
substantially across OECD countries, it tends to be concentrated among the same 
workers and in the same jobs.”  Low wage jobs are disproportionately found among those 
with relatively little education, among women and among youth and older workers. The 
types of people who do low wage work comprise four main groups. These are: 
•  school leavers (or current students) with no prior work experience 
•  sole mothers 
•  people previously unemployed or out of the labour force, such as mothers returning to 
the workforce  
•  displaced workers made redundant by business closures or restructuring who cannot 
find employment in their field of specialisation (such as men who lose jobs in 
manufacturing). 
In countries with a sizeable migrant population, recent migrants and migrants who are not 
fluent in the language of their new country are frequently found among the low wage 
workers, even if they have quite high levels of formal education.  
In the UK, the wages of people who are in entry jobs (ie, in the previous period were not 
employed, for whatever reason) are typically in the 20
th percentile of the overall wage 
distribution: people in entry jobs get paid significantly less, given their observable and 
unobserved characteristics, than do other employed people (Gregg and Wadsworth, 
2000). 
In the US, there is also a strong race dimension to the low wage group, with blacks and 
Hispanics over-represented. France and Japan have a relatively high proportion of women 
in their low wage population.  
Most research on low wage employment focuses on the first group because of the 
availability of longitudinal data on the employment dynamics of youth, which are rarely 
available for the other three groups.  
Tables 2 and 3 give an excellent overview of who are the low wage workers. Table 2 
shows what the typical low paid worker looks like in terms of age, sex and education. The 
comparisons focus on the main English-speaking countries, with Germany included to 
give the different European picture. Low wage workers are more likely to be women than 
men, except in Australia and New Zealand. Note that women make up fewer than half of 
the full-time workforce in all these countries, so that they are disproportionately likely to be 
low paid.  
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Table 2 - Distribution of Low-Paid Employment by Sex, Age and Education (%)* 
  Aust. Canada Germany NZ  UK  USA 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
By  sex           
Men  55.7  40.0  38.9 52.5 41.7  45.4 
Women  44.3  60.0  61.1 47.5 58.3  54.6 
By  age           
Under 25 yrs  46.6  22.9  58.6  41.0  28.5  21.6 
25-54  yrs  47.1  69.9  37.9 51.9 59.8  68.7 
55+ yrs  6.2  7.2  3.7  7.1  11.7  9.8 
By  education          
Basic na  7.7  75.4  56.5  na  21.3 
Upper sec.  na  56.5  11.  21.9  na  43.7 
Higher na  35.8  6.8  20.8  na  34.9 
 
Note:  The data refer only to full-time workers. Low wage is defined as less than two thirds of the median earnings of full-time workers. 
Source: Keese, Puymoyen and Swaim, 1998:230 
Table 3 - Incidence of Low-Paid Employment by Sex, Age and Education (%) 
  Aust. Canada Germany NZ  UK  U.SA 
Total  13.8  23.7  13.3 16.9 19.6  25.0 
By sex           
Men    11.8  16.1  7.6 14.4 12.8  19.6 
Women  17.7  34.3  25.4 20.7 31.2  32.5 
By age           
Under 25 yrs  34.5  57.1  50.4  41.3  45.8  63.0 
25-54  yrs  8.8  20.1  6.7 11.6 15.0  21.2 
55+  yrs  12.5  20.8  5.4 15.6 22.9  23.7 
By education           
Basic n.a.  36.3  15.9  23.5  n.a.  54.5 
Upper sec.  n.a.  28.5  26.3  10.7  n.a.  32.4 
Higher n.a.  17.6  4.2  14.2  n.a.  15.5 
 
Note: *The data refer only to full-time workers. Low wage is defined as less than two-thirds of the median earnings for full-time workers. 
Source: Keese, Puymoyen and Swaim, 1998:230 
 
With the exception of Australia and Germany, a clear majority of low wage workers are 
prime age (25-54). This is a very important statistic, because it makes it clear that low 
wages are not just a temporary event that young people experience in their transition from 
school to adult employment. It is also important because adults have adult responsibilities, 
including for the support and care of their children. Other evidence shows that many low 
wage adults live in families with an employed partner, which means that the family income 
is not necessarily low. But many others do not, in particular the women in mother-headed 
households. 
It is surprising that, with the exception of Germany, many of the low wage earners have 
quite high levels of education, between a fifth and a third having post-school education. 
De Grip and Nekkers (2001) report that in 1998, about 15% of high education workers in  
WP 02/29 |  LOW WAGE JOBS AND PATHWAYS TO BETTER OUTCOMES  17  
the Netherlands, Germany, France and the UK had low wages.
2
 This compares with 
between 40% (UK) and 55% (Netherlands and Germany) of the lowest education group. 
Table 3 shows the same information as Table 2, but presented in a different way. Rather 
than identify the low wage workers, Table 3 shows which groups have the highest 
likelihood of being in low wage work. As with Table 2, the data are confined to people who 
work full-time. While in most of the countries considered there are more men than women 
receiving low wages, in all the countries the chances of being in a low wage job are higher 
for women than for men. This is most strongly the case in Germany and the UK and least 
apparent for Australia and New Zealand. In Germany, women working full-time are 3.3 
times more likely to be in a low wage job than are men. In New Zealand, they are 1.4 
times more likely. In Canada, the UK and the US, over one fifth of full-time workers aged 
over 54 receive low wages. In New Zealand the figure is 16%. Germany, with only 5% of 
older workers and 7% of prime age workers working in low wage jobs, presents the 
strongest case for the view that low wage jobs are a temporary stepping stone for youth 
as they move into higher paid jobs. This characterisation is more true for Australia than it 
is for New Zealand, and is least true for the UK, Canada and the US. In the US and 
Canada, over 20% of full-time workers in the prime ages of 26-54 receive low wages.  
Those with more education clearly face lower risks of low wage employment in each of the 
countries for which there are data. In the US and Germany, it is higher education that 
makes the difference: in New Zealand it is upper secondary education. But more 
education is not fully protective. In Canada, New Zealand and the US, around 15% of full-
time workers with higher education worked in low wage jobs.  
The information presented in Tables 2 and 3 makes it plain that low wage workers are not 
homogeneous. While the risk of being low paid is everywhere higher for people under age 
25, in most of the OECD countries the majority of low wage workers are older than 25. In 
New Zealand, over half of the low paid are in the prime age group of 25-54. Similarly, 
while everywhere the risk of having a low wage is higher for women than for men, in 
Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands the majority of (full-time) low wage earners 
are men. If we ask what the typical low wage earner looks like, the answer will vary across 
the OECD. For the main English-speaking countries, the answer is that they are fairly 
evenly divided between the sexes, of prime age and have a basic or (in the case of 
Canada and the US), upper secondary education. Clearly, low wage employment is not 
confined to young people who have little formal education and who are using low paid 
jobs as a means to acquiring the skills to move on to better paid jobs.  
The picture presented above is based on people who work full-time. In the English-
speaking world, there has been a substantial growth in part-time employment over the 
past two decades. Many of these part-time jobs pay low wages. In studies of low wage 
workers in Australia, Richardson (1998) and Richardson and Harding (1999) examine all 
workers. This work concludes that: 
•  the profile of low wage workers is sensitive to the level at which the low wage is set 
(the higher the level, the more the low wage group looks like the general workforce) 
•  the risks of being in low wage work are higher for people who are female, employed 
part-time, aged 21-24, with low education, married if a woman and single if a man, 
and for non-student children living at home 
                                                                 
2  High education is defined as being in category 5-7 of the International Standard Classification of Education. Low wage is defined as 
the bottom three deciles of the wage distribution.  
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•  the typical low wage worker is female, employed full-time, of prime working age, 
married and with little formal education: about one third have dependent children 
•  nearly all low wage men work full-time and 30% have dependent children 
•  one-quarter have a post-school certificate or diploma and over half are married 
•  they are most likely found in sales, personal service or labouring jobs, employed in 
wholesale and retail industry 
•  27% lived at home with a parent 
•  the lower the wage, the more likely were the workers to be female, of prime age, 
employed part-time and married with dependent children. 
Richardson and Harding (1999: 153) conclude as follows.  
Low-wage workers are not predominantly the sons and daughters of the affluent 
middle class, working a few hours each week to finance their holiday in Bali while 
studying law and business. Nor are they predominantly hard-pressed heads of 
families struggling to put food on the table to feed their families. There are some each 
of these groups, but they are relatively small in number. The typical low-wage worker 
works full-time, is of prime age, with no formal education qualifications, probably 
married and equally likely to be male as to be female. One-third have dependent 
children. The men are more likely than the women to be found in low income families. 
Bernstein and Hartmann (1999:29, 39) provide a very useful summary not only of the 
current picture for the US, but also how it has been changing. They conclude: 
•  Low-wage workers are disproportionately female, minority, non-college-educated, 
nonunion, and concentrated in retail trade. 
•  These characteristics notwithstanding, the low-wage workforce is becoming more 
male and more highly educated, which is to be expected given widespread 
educational upgrading and the long-term wage decline among non–college 
graduates. 
•  The likelihood of being a low-wage worker has increased, even when the wage 
impacts of changes in education, experience, occupation, and industry are taken 
into account. 
•  Rising education and experience levels and occupational upgrading have 
combined to prevent the share of female workers in low-wage jobs from rising. 
This has not been the case for men, even though their total share of the low-
wage workforce is still below that of women. 
•  Like the rest of the workforce, the low-wage sector included more minorities and 
became older, more highly educated, and less likely to work in the manufacturing 
industry. 
•  Unlike the rest of the workforce, however, the low-wage sector included less 
women. 
•  Women made up an additional 4.3 percentage points of the total workforce, while 
their share in the low-wage group fell 9 percentage points.  
•  The “high school or less education” category declined by 13.5%. 
The profiles contained in both summaries confirm that not all people who are employed in 
low wage jobs are young, single and have low education.  
Young people are, however, more likely to be in low wage jobs than are older workers. 
This is entirely to be expected, as young people are making the transition from  
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student/child to independent working adult. Indeed, if all low wage workers were young 
(say, under the age of 25), then there would be little reason to worry about low wage jobs 
and every reason to believe that they represented a widely used means into higher paying 
jobs. By necessity, if all low wage workers are young, then duration in a low wage job is 
temporary.  
Of course, the proportion of low wage workers who are young will vary depending on the 
definition of low wage and of young. Thus the picture given by different studies varies in 
ways that do not necessarily reflect real differences. Using US data for the first half of the 
1990s, Long (1999) finds that as many as 46% of the workers earning the federal 
minimum wage are teenagers (aged 15-19), with only 6% aged 55 or more years. Similar 
percentages are reported by Card and Krueger (1995) and by Smith and Vavricheck 
(1992). When a more generous measure of low wage is used (two thirds of the median) 
and only full-time workers are considered, Table 2 shows that only 22% of US low wage 
workers are aged under 25. 
To illustrate the sensitivity of the characteristics of low wage workers to the level of low 
wage selected, Table 4 compares the profile of US workers who are low wage according 
to the OECD definition (and work full-time) with the profile of minimum wage workers.  
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Table 4 - Comparison of the characteristics of US low wage workers: (1) earning the 
minimum wage and (2) full-time earning less than two thirds of median 
earnings 
  Minimum wage  Two thirds median 
Total 100.0  100.0 
By sex:    
Men 40.7  45.4 
Women 59.3  54.6 
By age    
Under 25 yrs  64.6  21.6 
25-54 yrs  29.8  68.7 
55+ yrs  5.6  9.8 
By education    
Basic na  21.3 
Upper sec.  na  43.7 
Higher 19.5.  34.9 
Family status    
Married woman  16.5  na 
Married man  6.5  na 
Live with other adult relatives  66.8  na 
Live alone or with children only  10.2  na 
Source: For minimum wages, Long 1999:496. For two-thirds earnings, Keese, Puymoyen and Swain, 1998:230 
Compared with other OECD countries, the value of the US minimum wage is quite low. 
With this in mind, Table 4 provides a clear account of how the characteristics of low wage 
workers vary, depending on how low wage is defined. When the wage is set very low – as  
for the US minimum – then the low wage population is more female, much younger and 
considerably less educated than when a higher value of low wage is used. This US picture 
is consistent with that found for Australia (Richardson, 1998), where sensitivity of the low 
wage population to various levels of the low wage was explicitly examined.  The idea that 
low wage workers are mostly teenagers who live at home, and who rapidly move to higher 
paying jobs (and therefore whose low wages are unproblematic) has come mainly from 
US research that is based on the minimum wage population. 
As with the Australian and US data reported above, a number of publications provide a 
more nuanced picture of the characteristics of low wage workers. 
Entry jobs for people without higher education are typically low paid. In addition to youth, 
such jobs are taken by a) people who are unemployed, and b) mothers returning to the 
workforce. 
Gregg and Wadsworth (1998), using British evidence, find that a high proportion of people 
in entry jobs were previously unemployed: a quarter had had an unemployment spell of 
more than two years, and another quarter had been less than three months out of work. 
Gosling et al (1997) found that, in the UK during the early 1990s, 56% of people who 
moved from unemployment to a job had entry wages that were in the bottom fifth of the 
wage distribution. We will look later at interesting new evidence on the cycling between 
unemployment and low wage employment.  
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Mothers returning to the workforce have similar characteristics to displaced workers, with 
the added difficulties that their time out of the labour force is often longer and they often 
return to work in part-time jobs with little or no chances for promotion. The obstacles 
facing mothers of young children, especially sole mothers, tend to make upward mobility 
especially difficult. Perhaps for this reason, Kim (2000) finds that in the US low wage 
women tend to be never married (almost half of the women who have never married are 
low-paid), and have children: having three or more children under the age of six makes 
the risk of low pay very high. The recent changes to the US social welfare system, that 
prevent people remaining on social welfare payments for more than two continuous years, 
are likely to magnify the results reported by Kim. The sole mothers being pushed into 
employment are overwhelmingly going into low wage jobs. It will be of great interest to 
monitor what proportion are able to move on to better paid jobs after a spell. Initial 
indications are that there is some upward mobility in earnings, but it is modest. Savner et 
al (2002) report that “--in most states, earnings in the fourth quarter after exit [from the 
welfare system] grew by only a few hundred dollars when compared to earnings in the first 
quarter.” (p 3). A longer term study of welfare leavers in Wisconsin found that over three 
years earnings on average rose from $8,608 to $10,924, “ – still well below the US poverty 
line.” (p3) 
In addition to new entrants to the labour force, some people end up in low wage jobs as a 
result of losing a higher paying job. There is consistent evidence that workers who lose 
their jobs suffer both an immediate and a longer term loss in pay, even when re-employed 
soon after they lose their jobs. (Kletzer 1998, Gregory and Jukes 1998, Fallick 1996). 
Furthermore, their wage rate remains well below that of the previous job for a number of 
years, if not permanently. Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) estimate that for their 
sample of US displaced workers, total long-term wage losses were on average 25% of 
initial earnings per year and persisted even six years after separation. Jacobson et al 
argue that these earnings losses are not due to any individual characteristics of displaced 
workers, since their original median age, skills, tenure and earnings growth were similar to 
those of staying workers. They find no indication that displaced workers” earnings ever 
return to their prior expected levels. Thus displaced workers’ earnings losses may be 
permanent. 
While the evidence of wage decline for displaced workers is strong, the research appears 
to be silent on what proportion of displaced workers end up in low-wage jobs as defined 
for this paper. This is a relatively new area of research and more is yet to be known about 
displaced workers. More longitudinal data are needed to further our understanding of the 
employment dynamics of displaced workers. Theory, with some empirical support, leads 
us to expect that workers suffering the greatest wage fall on displacement would be those 
who had a high level of human capital that was specific to their employer and/or to an 
occupation or industry that is in decline; had a high quality job match with their last 
employer; had a high-paying last employer; and had a seniority component in their pay. 
The characteristics of low paid workers reported above have focussed on one feature at a 
time. It may well be, however, that sole mothers are likely to have low wages not because 
they are sole mothers, but because they are female and have low levels of education, for 
example. Some studies have sought to identify the impact on the probability of having a 
low wage of a specific attribute, holding other attributes constant.  
One consistent finding of such studies is that women are significantly more at risk of low 
wage work than are men, other things equal (Dunlop, 2000; Eardley, 1998; Asplund and 
Persson, 2000). So too are youth. If young people are excluded, Dunlop (2000:16) finds 
no relation between age and the probability of being in a low paid job. Multivariate  
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analysis supports the earlier conclusion, that never married people are more likely to be 
low paid than are those who are or have been married (Dunlop, 2000; Stewart and 
Swaffield, 1997). For migrant countries such as Australia, the US and Canada, there is 
strong evidence from the migration literature that limited capacity in English is associated 
with low wages (and unemployment). Geography matters too. Dunlop estimates that 
Australians living outside the metropolitan areas were 6 percentage points more likely to 
be low paid than their metropolitan counterparts (though this comparison makes no 
allowance for differences in the cost of living).  
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5  What are the low wage jobs? 
We turn now to the demand-side of the low pay literature, in a brief look at which jobs or 
industries are the most likely to pay low wages. 
We would expect low wage jobs to be found in places where workers are likely to have a 
relatively low productivity. These include jobs where workers are equipped with little 
physical capital and which require little scarce human capital. Such jobs are found 
relatively frequently in the services sector, especially in personal services and in retailing. 
Large numbers of earnings regressions run in many countries find that employment in 
small firms and in the private sector, other things equal, is associated with lower wages. 
This suggests that small private sector firms will be responsible for a disproportionate 
share of low wage jobs. The empirical evidence supports these suppositions. 
Long (1999) and Smith and Vavricheck (1992) found that about 55% of minimum wage 
earners in the US in the first half of the 1990s worked in the retail trade industry—a large 
proportion being in hospitality. This is consistent with the Australian evidence cited earlier 
(although there, for men, labouring jobs were also important) and with other American 
evidence (Kim 2000). It is also consistent with the conclusion drawn by the OECD, that “A 
high proportion of all jobs in the wholesale, retail and catering sector are low paid, 
whereas such jobs are scarce in transportation and communications, and public 
administration.” (OECD, 1997:8). 
In a detailed description of entry jobs, using data from 1997-98 Labour Force Survey in 
Britain, Gregg and Wadsworth (2000) find that low paid entry level jobs are often located 
in expanding or high-turnover sectors. These are mostly in retail  (27% of entry jobs), 
“other” services- ie, other than retail, transport or finance - (27%) and manufacturing 
(18%) industries. They are most likely to be less-skilled manual (40%) and non-manual 
(30%) jobs.  Eighty seven% of entry jobs are in the private sector. According to Gregg and 
Wadsworth, while three-quarters of all jobs are permanent full-time, the ratio is only one-
third in entry jobs. While only 7% of all jobs are temporary contract jobs, the figure is one-
third for entry jobs. Entry jobs are thus relatively insecure, as well as being low paid. 
The above-cited literature on low-paid workers highlights the fact that certain industries 
and occupations pay low wages. These occupations are mostly in low-skills services such 
as retail, personal services, and are more likely to be in small private sector 
establishments. Also, the low-paid workers are often in part-time casual or contract jobs. 
Many low wage jobs are part-time and/or casual. The extent of part-time work and its 
relation with low pay varies considerably around the OECD (ILO 1997). Australia and the 
UK, with about one quarter of their workers employed part-time, are at the high end of 
OECD countries (OECD, 1999). In most countries, part-time jobs are relatively low paid 
and have fewer fringe benefits than equivalent full-time jobs and are disproportionately 
taken by female workers. The main reason for the low pay is the type of job done: it is not 
usual to pay less per hour to a part-time worker than is paid to a full-time worker doing the 
same job (ILO, 1997). Indeed, the European Directive on Part-time Employment now 
requires countries to act to ensure that workers who are employed part-time are not 
thereby made worse off on a pro-rata basis. Part-time work tends to be in industries and 
occupations that have low pay. For example, it is unusual to have people in supervisory 
positions working part-time. In the European Union, in the mid-1990s only about 3% of 
men aged 24-49 were employed part-time (OECD, 1999). While part-time work and  
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casual work are different categories, in practice they often overlap. In Australia, people 
who are employed on a casual basis are required to be paid about an additional 20% in 
order to compensate for the absence of benefits such as paid leave. This arrangement is 
unusual.  
In a study of part-time work in the UK, Tam (1997: 243) concludes that, compared with 
full-time work, it has a number of disadvantages for future employment prospects.  
Because of the low-skill nature of part-time work, it has a channelling effect on 
women's lifetime employment prospects. This study shows that while part-time work is 
not associated with job insecurity and unemployment, it constitutes a trap which 
lowers women's lifetime employment prospects and earnings. 
The link between part-time work and low wages is complex. On the one hand, part-time 
work is frequently used by mothers as a way of reconciling the demands of home and paid 
employment. In Australia, most are happy to work part-time. Such jobs are often also 
taken by full-time students as a way of supplementing their incomes while studying. In 
many of these cases, part-time work is not problematic. On the other hand, increasing 
numbers of young people not in full-time education, and adult males, are accepting part-
time work  because they can find no better. In evidence given below, sole mothers in the 
US are quite unable to earn enough to provide an adequate standard of living if they work 
part-time: the combination of short hours and low pay leads to very low earnings. 
Harley and Whitehouse (2001) use UK and Australian data to examine whether women 
employed part-time earn less and have poorer conditions of employment than their sisters 
in full-time jobs. They conclude that part-time workers in the UK are worse off than those 
in Australia. In both countries, part-time workers have some disadvantage in terms of 
relative earnings, autonomy on the job, and feelings of job insecurity. But the extent of the 
disadvantage, especially in Australia, is generally quite small. 
To this point we have defined low wages and described who occupies low wage jobs and 
where these jobs are found. Before we go on to consider the central question of this 
review – the extent to which low wage workers are able to move on to better jobs – we  
consider briefly why firms pay low wages, and why workers accept them.  
WP 02/29 |  LOW WAGE JOBS AND PATHWAYS TO BETTER OUTCOMES  25  
6  Why pay low wages? 
It is almost tautological to say that firms pay low wages because the marginal productivity 
to them of the worker is low. There is a vast amount of empirical work done by economists 
to understand why some workers have low productivity (ie, are paid low wages) while 
other people have high productivity (ie, are paid high wages). It is clear from this work that 
the number of years of experience in paid work and levels of formal education are 
important factors in causing higher wages. Generally, people who have been in the paid 
labour force longer and/or have more education have higher wages. It is also often true 
that people who have been with the same employer longer are paid higher wages, 
although more recent work finds that voluntary movers often have wages higher than 
stayers. This worker-based perspective does not explain on what basis firms choose to 
employ a greater or fewer number of low productivity workers. 
The positive link between experience and wages is interpreted by labour economists to 
mean that people learn important skills on the job, formally or informally (see Acemoglou 
and Pischke, 1999, for a summary). These skills enhance their productivity, and it is this 
additional productivity that is rewarded with higher wages. Some of the skills learned will 
only be of value to the current employer, eg, unique work processes, culture or customer 
details and whether the job is a good match for worker and firm. It is these firm-specific 
skills that are rewarded by wages that rise with tenure. This standard interpretation is not 
without its critics. But it describes the empirical regularities well enough and has a 
coherent, human capital, theoretical base. It embeds the idea that low wage jobs provide 
the first foot on the ladder. People who start employment without substantial skills learned 
in the formal education system must learn on the job the skills needed to be a productive 
worker. Low wages facilitate this learning in two ways. One is that it can be profitable to 
employ people without particular skills if it is not necessary to pay them very much. The 
other is that the payment of low wages means that the costs of acquiring skills on the job 
are borne at least in part by the worker. It is also implicit in this standard human capital 
formulation that some jobs will not facilitate much upward wage mobility. These are jobs in 
which the skills required are low level and quickly learned and are not the foundation for 
further skills development in the firm or the occupation. The fact of being employed is not 
sufficient to ensure that more than the most basic skills (such as turning up on time and 
being reasonably reliable) are learned. For early employment to be the beginning of wage 
progression with experience, some processes must be in place to develop the productive 
skills of the worker. These may be formal or informal. But the repetition of relatively simple 
tasks, such as cleaning, will not of itself provide the foundation for upward wage mobility. 
The issue to be briefly discussed in this section is what motivates firms to seek to employ 
workers whom they believe have a low productivity. Which firms, and why, employ new 
entrants to the labour force who have relatively low levels of education, and employ 
people who have been out of a job because of unemployment or for family and other 
reasons? 
We know that employers of low skill labour tend to be in the private sector, to be small, 
and to be in service industries, particularly retailing, personal services and low skill clerical 
and cleaning services provided to business. But we also know that within quite narrowly 
defined industries and even occupations, there is a wide variation in the level of wages 
paid by different firms (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999).   
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6.1  Intrinsic to the work 
It is fully consistent with standard human capital theory and the assumption of a 
competitive labour market that some jobs will require low levels of skill to perform, and 
that the workers who do them will in consequence be paid a low wage. Examples are 
cleaning, collecting tickets and picking fruit. At a macro level, the number of such jobs 
offered by firms will be influenced by the pattern of consumer demand, technological 
change, the technical and regulatory capacity to import low skill-intensive products and 
services, and the costs of employing low skill labour. It is clear from the diversity among 
the OECD countries in the proportion of workers who are low paid, that the skill intensity 
of overall production is not simply determined by technological possibilities. But available 
technology is relevant. In all OECD countries, low wage jobs are found in similar 
industries and occupations and this is best understood as being the consequence of 
shared methods of production. 
If parts of a firm’s production process can be performed using low levels of skill, and if the 
institutions of the economy permit commensurately low wages to be paid, then profit-
maximising firms are likely to choose a low productivity/low wage production technology. 
The interesting empirical question is to understand the extent to which firms have choices 
about using low skill/low pay technologies as distinct from higher skill/paying alternatives. 
What proportion of the work performed by low wage jobs is capable of being performed in 
ways that are higher productivity, and thus would be consistent with paying a higher 
wage? This is a complex question on which recent work is shedding considerable light. 
We touch only lightly on this topic because we interpret the questions that motivated this 
paper to be ones that center on the experience of workers. 
6.2  Choice of skill levels in production 
While some low wage jobs may intrinsically involve low productivity, others are low wage 
as a matter of choice by the firm. Technology will determine some of the options 
available—is there a high productivity technique available? If so, what determines whether 
or not a firm chooses that path? One set of factors that is relevant is the capital 
requirements of the alternative technologies. Higher labour productivity is usually the 
result of the application of more capital (physical and/or human) to the production process. 
Thus one reason for firms to choose different skill strategies for their labour force is that 
they face different costs of capital. In particular, small businesses often face greater costs 
of borrowing than do larger firms, because they are more risky. We can understand part of 
the observed variation in the use of low wage labour in terms of differences in the costs of 
complementary factors of production. 
But it is likely that in some cases there is simply more than one profit-maximising 
combination of skill levels and capital that is available to the firm. Some firms choose the 
higher skill/wage route while others choose the lower skill/wage route. The profitability of 
these choices will be influenced by how low the costs of employing low wage labour can 
fall. Lane and Stevens (2001:3) cite a number of studies that lead them to conclude that 
“—firms, even within quite narrowly defined industries have quite different, and persistent, 
workforce composition, productivity and turnover patterns.” This important work makes 
clear that there is not a single profit maximising technology and production strategy that 
will be adopted by each firm that is in the same product market. (Nor can we rule out that 
at any moment of time there will be a number of firms that, through incompetence, are 
employing strategies that are not profit maximising). The conclusion is important because  
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the choices made by firms have substantial impacts on the opportunities that are available 
to workers.  
There is strong empirical evidence that low wage jobs are subject to significantly higher 
turnover than are higher wage jobs. A firm deciding to use a low wage/skill production 
strategy must take into account not just the relative costs of capital, skilled and unskilled 
labour, but also the costs of turnover. Turnover is expensive to a firm because of the costs 
of hiring and firing and because workers accumulate knowledge on the job that is specific 
to the firm. A number of studies have noted that the US has relatively low levels of firm-
provided training and relatively efficient job matching services and high levels of turnover 
(Brunello and Medio (2001); Freeman (1995); Blinder and Krueger (1991). The two are 
believed to be related. That is, firms do not train because they do not expect workers to 
stay long enough to enable them to obtain an adequate return on the costs of training. It is 
cheaper to acquire the skills they need from the market, or to use low skill methods of 
production. The lack of investment in training of workers, and the payment of low wages, 
in turn encourage workers to quit, which reinforces the low training, high turnover 
equilibrium.  
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7  Why accept low wages? 
The simple answer to the question of why accept a low wage job is that people cannot do 
any better. But within this overall response are hidden a number of reasons that are worth 
distinguishing. 
7.1 Low  productivity 
A whole book could be written on why people have low productivity. Here we summarise 
the sources of low productivity without providing a full explanation of any of them. The 
purpose of this section is to make clear that there is a variety of reasons why people have 
low productivity. 
In the simple model of the labour market, people are paid low wages because they have a 
low marginal product. In practice, low marginal product is interpreted to mean that they 
have low skills. A human capital perspective dominates our understanding of what 
comprises skills, and how to obtain them. Thus people have low wages because they 
have low human capital. The major components of human capital are formal education 
and skills learned on the job. This line of reasoning concludes that people have low 
productivity, and hence low wages, because they have not put the effort into learning 
productive skills through the formal education system, or have not found a job, and stuck 
at it, in which they can learn skills in a less formal manner.  
Why do people not learn the skills necessary to obtain a job that pays a reasonable 
wage? Part of the reason may be choice. Learning skills is an investment, in which the 
costs are incurred early and the payoffs are received over time. As in any investment, the 
present value of the return on the investment depends on the discount rate, or emphasis 
given to the present over the future. For a number of reasons (including inability to borrow 
or to otherwise finance their time out for education) some people have higher discount 
rates than others. People with high discount rates will be discouraged from investing in 
education. We do not here go into the reasons for high discount rates. We note, however, 
that there is a systematic relation between high discount rates and low socio-economic 
status.  
The expected returns to formal education will also be low for people (women) who do not 
expect to spend the major portion of their working age years in full-time employment. 
But low levels of human capital are not always a matter of choice. We need to remind 
ourselves that earnings equations that seek to explain differences in levels of earnings, 
and emphasise returns to human capital, leave a great deal of the variance unexplained. 
Some people do not proceed with formal education because they fail. They may be poorly 
taught or not have the intellect required to comprehend the material, or not have access to 
a range of educational opportunities, or be bullied and humiliated at school. People who 
come from difficult family backgrounds, for example where there is abuse, or addiction or 
criminal behaviour or mental illness, are not likely to find the ordinary classroom a very 
productive place.  
On-the-job learning is possible, of course, only if the work requires more than elementary 
skills, and the employer is willing to provide support for that learning.   
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People who have acquired some level of skills may lose them through job loss. Job loss 
can lead to loss of human capital because skills were specific to the employer or the 
occupation. If the job loss results in unemployment, there can be a general loss of skills 
and motivation, especially if the unemployment is long term. 
Le and Miller (2001) study marginal workers in Australia (ie, people who obtained jobs 
from unemployment or under-employment).  They conclude that the overwhelming reason 
for the low socio-economic status of the jobs these people are able to find is their low 
levels of human capital (formal education, general work experience, tenure on the job, and 
the negative effects of a long elapsed time between leaving education and finding their 
first job). The fact that they were less likely to work in the public sector and more likely to 
work for small employers also contributed to their poorer outcomes. 
7.2  Other causes of low wages 
While most attention in the economics literature is directed to low human capital as the 
source of low wages, there are other causes which we draw attention to here.  
People may be paid a low wage because the skills that they have do not match what the 
employer wants. There is now a considerable literature on job search and the importance 
of a good match and we will say more about this later. A mismatch may occur because of 
ignorance on either side of the match. Or it may occur because the worker does not live 
within reach of a job that suits her or his skills. Geographical mobility is an important 
source of reduced unemployment, and has identifiable positive impacts on wages as well. 
The job offers available to workers may be poor because of discrimination. There is a 
large literature on discrimination against women that identifies the wage penalty that they 
face on account of their sex. In the US, discrimination on the grounds of race is also well 
documented. People with criminal backgrounds (up to 60% of young black men in the US, 
Rangarajan, forthcoming) face even greater obstacles. Discrimination does not 
necessarily mean that the only job available is a low wage job. But its effect is to lower the 
quality of the job offers received, and thereby will lead to a larger proportion of the 
relevant group having to accept a low wage job. 
Wages are not the only attribute of a job. People may accept low wages because they are 
compensated for by other characteristics. The work to be done may be especially 
attractive (in the arts, or as a park ranger). There may be excellent opportunities for 
further skills development, as is formally structured into apprenticeships. There may be 
high levels of job security (although in the main low wage jobs are less attractive in non-
wage benefits, including security). Finally, some people are constrained by other 
dimensions of their lives to limit their search to jobs that are geographically proximate or 
have hours of work that fit with their other obligations.  
7.3  Jobs as stepping stones 
The whole notion of on-the-job training as investment in human capital implies that the 
return to employment in a job (including a low wage job) can include the expectation of a 
greater level of future earnings. A job with initial low earnings that leads to a future job 
with higher earnings can be called a stepping stone job. In an important paper, Connolly 
and Gottschalk (2001) analyse such jobs both theoretically and empirically.   
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In brief, they model jobs as having three dimensions. One is the current wage. The 
second is the expected rate of growth of that wage with tenure. The third is the access 
that the job will give to a better set of wage offers in future.  This neatly represents the 
difference between a dead-end job and a stepping stone job. The former is one where 
there is little or no prospect of  real wage growth in that job and the job does not improve 
future wage offers. We report their empirical findings in a later section which discusses 
how to exit low wage jobs. 
7.4  Is a low wage job better than no job? 
It is tautological to say that people accept low wage jobs because they are better than the 
alternative. In the short run, the alternative to a low wage job is no job. There are a 
number of dimensions to the comparison between no job and a low wage job, and we 
here set them out briefly. 
A job provides: 
•  a current wage 
•  an expected future wage in that job 
•  an expected future probability of being employed 
•  an expected future wage in a different job 
•  an imposed structure to the use of time 
•  an obligation to undertake tasks at the direction of someone else 
•  an impact on self-esteem and psychological well-being. 
The current policy movement to emphasise employment rather than the receipt of social 
welfare is justified in large part by the belief that, whatever the individual at the time thinks, 
he or she is better off in the longer run by taking any sort of job than by being on a welfare 
benefit. In signing the US Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act, President Clinton said “Today, we are ending welfare as we know it. But I hope that 
this day will be remembered not for what it ended, but for what it began—a new day that 
offers hope, honors responsibility, rewards work---” (cited in Rangarajan, forthcoming). In 
fact what Clinton was signing was an Act that severely limited the alternative to a low 
wage job that many Americans relied on. Whether or not it is in the interests of potential 
low wage workers (as distinct from the taxpayers) to require them to work in a low wage 
job, rather than to receive a welfare payment, is a question that we explore empirically 
later on. It is clear from their choices that many of the people affected by the welfare 
changes in the US did not anticipate being better off from working in a low wage job. Were 
they wrong?  
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8  How much mobility is there? 
8.1 Measuring  mobility 
To obtain a sound understanding of the degree of mobility from low wage jobs to better 
jobs, or to unemployment or out of the labour force, it is necessary to have longitudinal 
data, that follow the same individuals over time. These data are more difficult and 
expensive to obtain than normal survey data. In consequence, they are less 
comprehensive across time, countries and questions than are data based on cross 
section surveys. Nonetheless, there are now sufficient longitudinal surveys (or 
administrative data that enable individuals to be tracked) that reasonable conclusions can 
be drawn. Sound empirical data are crucial, since the question is not “is there upward 
mobility?”, but how much mobility is there and what causes it. In reporting on the degree 
of labour market mobility, it is sensible to confine attention to people who are not also full-
time students. 
We have defined as upwardly mobile, people who move from a low wage job in period 1 
to a higher paying job in period 2. The emphasis is on movement to a higher hourly wage, 
rather than to a higher weekly or annual earnings (which is affected by the number of 
hours worked). People are immobile if in period 2 they are still in a low wage job, have 
withdrawn from the workforce, or are unemployed. 
Mobility is usually expressed in terms of transition probabilities. These describe what 
proportion of the low wage group in period 1 has moved to a higher wage in the next 
period (or has dropped out of employment). In most cases the empirical evidence for the 
US and the UK concludes that there is strong persistence in low pay status. A person who 
is currently low paid has a much higher chance of being low paid in the next period, than 
an otherwise similar person who initially had higher pay. (Stewart and Swaffield, 
1999;Stewart, 2002; Connolly and Gottschalk, 2001).  
We expect that mobility will be higher the longer is the time interval that distinguishes 
period 1 from period 2, and empirical evidence confirms that this is the case. 
8.2  Mobility in the UK 
Evidence from Great Britain (Dickens, 2000) shows that hourly wage mobility measured 
from year to year is low, but increases when measured over longer periods of time. For 
example, Dickens finds that, for males in the bottom decile of the wage distribution, only 
between 20 and 34% move up (with 35 to 45% of these only moving as far as the next 
decile) after one year (1993 to 1994). Between 43 and 48% remain in the tenth decile and 
the rest fall out of employment. Females’ mobility patterns after one year are similar to 
those of males. Measured over three years (1991 - 1994), mobility is greater than for just 
one year, but Dickens’ evidence shows that movement to a higher wage decile is still the 
minority experience for those who started in the bottom decile. Between 26 and 31% of 
males in the bottom decile remain there after three years; 25 to 32% move out of 
employment (about 10% were unemployed), while only 26 to 40% move up: only half of 
the upward-movers go beyond the second wage decile. Again, females’ wage mobility is 
similar to that of males, although low wage women are more likely than men to leave the 
labour force. The evidence on wage mobility over five years shows that it is a little higher  
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than over three years, but many are lost from the sample. Of those who could be traced, 
fewer than one third of men and women in the bottom decile of the wage distribution at the 
beginning of the period moved to a higher decile job over five years. Stewart and 
Swaffield (1999) produce similar findings: they find a high degree of persistence in the 
earnings distribution, with low wage earners moving frequently between low wage jobs 
and unemployment.  
The mobility estimates of Stewart and Swaffield (1999) illustrate the point that the lower 
the threshold for the definition of low wage, the greater the mobility. They use three 
measures of low wage—half the median, half the mean and two thirds of the median full-
time gross hourly adult wages. These define between 8 to 22% of men and 24 to 49% of 
women as low paid (using the 1991 panel of the British Household Panel Survey). They 
find that for women, 75%, 83% and 87% respectively do not move above each of the low 
wage thresholds. The comparable figures for men are 60%, 65% and 75%. People who 
move out of wage jobs (into unemployment, non-employment or self-employment) are 
included in the percentage who do not move up. (p 27). 
The movement between low wage employment and unemployment is examined in detail, 
for the UK, by Stewart (2002). Stewart seeks to explain why a large proportion of people 
who move from unemployment to a job then fall back into unemployment again. He 
describes the experience of unemployment, and of low wage employment, as exhibiting 
state dependence. That is, the probability of being unemployed, or employed in a low 
wage job, in period 2 is strongly positively influenced by having been in that same state in 
period 1. An innovation in Stewart’s work is that he is able empirically to control for a 
range of observed and unobserved characteristics that of themselves predict 
unemployment/low wage, such as age and education. He chooses a measure of low pay 
that classifies about 10% of employees as low paid (quite a low value—which should bias 
his results towards relatively high mobility). He concludes that those who were low paid in 
period 1 were about 17 times more likely to be low paid in period 2 than were workers who 
were paid higher wages in period 1. (p 4). For people who were the same in terms of 
years of education, possessing a qualification, years of experience, gender, marital status, 
health status and whether resident in London or the South East, the ratio was reduced, 
but only to 14. Not only are low paid workers much more likely than higher paid workers to 
be low paid in the next period, they are also almost three times as likely to be 
unemployed. He interprets this and other evidence to show that there is a “low pay-no pay 
cycle” (p 5).  
Dickens finds that short-term wage mobility in the UK fell between 1975 and 1994. This 
fall in mobility mainly occurred in the middle income deciles, while the wage mobility at the 
top and the bottom of the wage distribution has remained low throughout the period. 
Nevertheless, Dickens also finds evidence that low-wage earners, the group we are 
focussing on, are more likely to get stuck between states of unemployment or non-
employment and low-paying jobs than they were in the 1970s (see also Stewart and 
Swaffield, 1999). Dickens concludes that “the low paid are worse off both in terms of the 
relative wage they receive and in terms of their opportunity to progress out of the low-pay 
trap.” (p 496) 
8.3  Mobility in the US 
British workers are not alone in their experience of reduced wage mobility. Buchinsky and 
Hunt (1999) report similar patterns of declining wage mobility in the US, especially at the 
bottom end of the wage ladder. They use data from the US National Longitudinal Survey  
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of Youth (NLSY) for the period 1979-91, for young civilian wage earners who have ceased 
formal schooling. Their sample was aged from 14 to 24 in 1979. They find that wage 
mobility over a four-year period reduced wage inequality by 12 to 26%. This mobility 
predominantly occurs within groups of people with the same observable characteristics 
(ie, the same age, sex, education, race and level of experience at the start of the time 
horizon). In addition, they calculate the probability of moving or staying in the same wage 
quintile. Here they find, for all education and experience groups, that the probability of 
staying within the same quintile is high for all quintiles, but much higher for the low 
quintiles. Furthermore, this staying probability has sharply increased over time, meaning a 
rising inequality and a rapidly falling mobility. For example, the unconditional probability of 
staying in the first earnings quintile has increased from 33% in 1980 to 56% in 1990. 
Similarly, the probability of staying in the first wages quintile has risen from about 27% to 
55% during the same period. Increases by about 20 - 30% in the staying probabilities are 
common for the first to the fourth quintiles of both the earnings and wages distribution, 
indicating a general rise in inequality.  Overall, for the years 1990-91, wage inequality over 
the two years was 7% lower than the average of inequality for each of the two years.  
Buchinsky and Hunt (1999) draw the important conclusion that the rise in cross-section 
wage inequality in the US, between 1979 and 1990 in their data, “reflects a severe 
widening of gaps between the same individuals.” (p 361). The rising cross-section 
inequality has been accompanied by a sharp fall in mobility, across all skill groups but 
especially for the less skilled. There is no comfort here from the hope that high levels of 
wage mobility mean that cross-section inequality does not translate into worrying levels of 
lifetime inequality. 
As expected, the upward wage mobility of youth is relatively high. In the US, it is mainly 
teenagers who are paid at or very close to the minimum rate. Of course, people do not 
stay teenagers for long, so there is considerable upward wage mobility for youth. Even so, 
Carrington and Fallick (2001) find that “more than 8% of workers spend at least 50% of 
their first 10 post-school years working in jobs paying less than the minimum wage plus 
$1.” These are predominantly black and women and less educated. 
In contrast, Long (1999) finds evidence of substantial wage mobility among the low-paid 
US workers. Using data from the 1991 and 1992 Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP), Long analyses the earnings and labour force status of respondents 
one and two years after they were in jobs paying the minimum wage. He finds that after 
one year of employment, seven in ten minimum wage workers stay employed on an hourly 
wage, just under 6% are either in a salaried job or self-employed, 5% are unemployed, 
and 20% have left the labour force. Long estimates that about 64% of minimum wage 
workers had a real wage increase, averaging 30% in one year. After two years, two-thirds 
of minimum wage workers were still in hourly paid jobs (down from seven in ten), with 
68% of them reporting real wage increases (up from 64%). Minimum wage workers who 
moved to salaried positions reported earnings growth of more than double. These figures 
suggest mixed outcomes in term of employment status, and significant (given the short 
period of two years) upward wage mobility for US minimum wage workers who stay 
employed. However, Long’s sample has a high proportion of youth: About 46% of the 
respondents were aged between 15 and 19. Again, Long’s findings reinforce the 
expectation that youth have higher upward wage mobility than other low-wage earners. 
Recall also that the US minimum wage is low compared with the more common measure 
of low wage, namely two thirds of the median wage.  
Table 5, from Carrington and Fallick (2001), shows the movement into and out of 
minimum wage jobs in the US, for young people who had been in the full-time labour force  
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for up to 10 years (ending in 1995). The data come from the National Longitudinal Study 
of Youth, 1979 panel. The measure of low wages is the minimum wage plus $0.25. This is 
a very severe measure of low wage. But the transition probabilities show exactly the sort 
of information that is needed to obtain a good understanding of the extent to which people 
get stuck in low wage (in this case, minimum wage) jobs. For this reason, it is worth 
reporting, as an upper bound to mobility.  
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Table 5 - Transition rates into and out of minimum wage jobs, by years into career 
(%) 
Transition  Year (t-1) – year (t) 
  1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 
Worker holds non-minimum wage job in 
first year 
         
1.  Probability of minimum wage job in second 
year 
10.5 8.4 6.7 5.3 4.7 4.6 4.3 3.8 3.7 
2.  Probability of non-minimum wage job in 
second year 
89.5 91.6 93.3 94.7 95.3 95.4 95.7 96.2 97.3 
Worker holds minimum wage job in first 
year 
         
3.  Probability of minimum wage job in second 
year 
53.6 44.9 42.9 38.4 37.2 44.7 33.7 44.6 46.1 
4.  Probability of non-minimum wage job in 
second year 
46.4 55.1 57.1 61.6 62.8 55.3 56.3 55.4 53.9 
 
Notes: A job in year t is a minimum wage job if it pays less than the minimum wage plus $.25 in year t, where years are indexed by 
their position within a person's career. 
Source: Carrington and Fallick (2001), from the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. 
The table refers to people who are no more than 10 years out of full-time education. It 
shows the proportion who make the transition into or out of a minimum wage job in year 2, 
contingent on having been/not been in a minimum wage job in year 1. This is shown for 
people with varying levels of workforce experience. It shows that once a person leaves a 
minimum wage job for a higher paying one, she/he rarely falls back into a minimum wage 
job. People who start the year in a minimum wage job have about a 50:50 chance of 
moving to a higher paying job by the next year, independent of how long they have been 
in the labour force. As Buchinsky and Hunt (1999) show, for many the move is not very far 
up the wage scale. Indeed, Carrington and Fallick themselves conclude that “- a   
substantial proportion of most workers early careers is spent on minimum or near 
minimum wage jobs” (p 23). Specifically, the average worker spent 29% of his/her first 6 
years of employment in jobs paying no more than the minimum wage plus $2.00. 
In an important study, Gottschalk (2001) examines the dispersion of wage outcomes for 
people who stay in the one job, for people who move straight from one job to another, and 
for people who experience a period of non-employment before finding their next job. He 
uses US data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP, 1986-93). 
Each person (aged 18-55) in the data set is followed for a period of 24-40 months. Job 
changes and wages can be tracked. While on average, real wages grow from one year to 
the next, there is a wide dispersion of wage changes around this average. For many 
people, real wages fall, both for those who stay in the one job and even for some of those 
who move direct from one job to another. Specifically, for people who stayed with the one 
employer, on average real wages grew by 3.2% (female) or 2.1% (male). This growth rose 
to 3.7% and 4.0% respectively if people moved directly to a new job. However, if there 
was a spell of non-employment before obtaining a new job, real wages on average fell, by 
2.6 and 2.9% respectively.  
These averages conceal considerable diversity. Seventy% of people with less than high 
school education experienced a fall in their real wage if they stayed in the same job, as 
did 56% of those with college degrees. These percentages were less for people with 
longer tenure. The comparable figures for those who moved directly to a new job are 52 
and 47%. For those who went to a new job via a spell of non-employment, the comparable  
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figures are 58 and 54%. In each case, gender did not make a difference. For all levels of 
education, both average and median wage growth for those who moved via a spell of non-
employment was negative. For job stayers, the median, if not the average, was also 
negative. (p 19-21). 
The results produced by Gottshalk imply that individuals face considerable instability in 
their real wages, even if they stay in the same job. For the majority of employees over the 
period examined, the movement in their real wage was down rather than up. The least 
skilled were the ones most likely to have a fall in their real wage, whether they stayed in 
the same job or moved. There was clearly a large range of wage movements experienced 
by US workers in the late 1980s and early 1990s. While the majority suffered a fall in their 
real wage, a minority had increases that were large enough to ensure that average wages 
rose. This combination of outcomes reminds us how important it is to look behind the 
averages when seeking to understand mobility and wage movements. It also shows how 
difficult it was for low wage US workers in the late 1980s and early 1990s to gain rises in 
their real wages: it clearly is wrong to assume that work experience and willingness to 
stick with a job routinely lead to rising real wages. We note that over the last 5 years low 
wage workers in the US have on average begun to obtain some rise in their real wages: 
conclusions based on the earlier period may have less force in the contemporary 
environment.   
The evidence of limited mobility for low wage workers is reinforced by the evidence 
presented by Connolly and Gottschalk (2001). Their sample includes people aged 18-55 
who had no more than secondary school education. It is taken from the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation 1986-88 and 1990-93 panels. They formally model the 
possibility that workers will quit their current job for one that may even pay less, if it is 
expected to improve future wage offers. They draw several relevant conclusions. First, 
people employed in jobs that have low wages and low prospects of wage growth are 
much more likely to have short tenure in the job than people in high wage/high wage 
growth jobs (only around 12% of such jobs lasted more than 28 months, compared with 
about 55% for the better jobs: p20). Second, “People in jobs with low starting wages or 
low wage growth are most likely to obtain offers of similar jobs. Thus, even forward 
looking agents are likely to remain in jobs with poor prospects.” (p 31). They were unable 
to measure with sufficient precision whether the role played by stepping stone jobs was 
quantitatively substantial, so they remain agnostic on this point.  
8.4  Mobility in the OECD 
The evidence reported so far is derived largely from the two main English-speaking 
countries, the US and the UK. We know that these two countries are unusual among the 
OECD for the degree to which they have a hands-off approach to the labour market, and 
for the level of wage inequality that they experience. It is thus useful to look more broadly. 
To do this, I draw on recent work by the OECD. 
The OECD (1997) uses comparable longitudinal data from up to six countries to compare 
various measures of wage mobility. They define low wage to be a wage of less than two 
thirds of the median. They find evidence of large disparities in wage mobility for low-wage 
workers among the six countries (Denmark, Italy, UK, US, Germany and France). For 
example, of the low-paid workers in 1986 in Denmark, only 8% were still low paid in 1991, 
compared to over one-half in the US. However, when the reference is broadened to 
include all those who were in low-paid jobs in 1986 regardless of what they were doing in 
1991, the report finds that seven out of ten US low-paid workers in 1986 were either still  
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low paid in 1991 or no longer working full-time. For Danish workers, the proportion was 
one-third. 
This, the report comments, suggests that the larger the share of employment in low-paid 
jobs, the higher the persistence of low pay status and the wider the earning distribution, 
the harder it is for low wage workers to move up the ladder.  
Evidence for Germany, Denmark, France, Italy Sweden, UK and US, indicates that 
earnings mobility for the entire set of full-time workers is similar and substantial; viz about 
half of workers changed quintiles between 1986 and 1991, and between 11 and 17% 
moved two quintiles. Nonetheless, the earnings inequality across the whole 5 years was 
about 80% of the earnings inequality of one year. (Keese et al, 1998). These conclusions 
apply only to people who were continuously employed full-time workers. Wages fall as 
well as rise. The share of workers with falling real wages (despite increasing experience) 
ranged from 6% in Germany to 29% in US.  
Over the five years, there is considerable movement out of the low wage category, and 
considerable differences in this between countries. On every measure, the US (followed 
by the UK) has the highest inequality and the lowest mobility. For example, if we look only 
at people employed full-time over the 5 years, 75% of US and 61% of UK workers who 
were low paid (ie, paid below two thirds of the median) in 1991 were also low paid in 
1986. Looked at the other way, 58/40% of US/UK workers who were low paid in 1986 
were also low paid in 1991. In the low inequality countries of Denmark and Sweden, very 
few workers (6-10%) stay low paid. 
If we include moving out of full-time employment with staying in the low wage category as 
a no-upward-mobility state, then 71% of US low wage workers in 1986 were not mobile by 
1991. Of those who did move up, only 11% had moved above 95% of the median, 
compared with about one quarter for Sweden and Denmark. A large majority of those who 
left full-time employment moved out of the labour force rather than into part-time or self-
employment. Low paid workers were much more likely to exit than were higher paid 
workers. “Averaging over the countries in our sample, first-quintile workers were about 
twice as likely to leave full-time employment as were third-quintile workers.” (Keese et al, 
1998: 250). If we look only at full-time workers in both years, 16% of US low paid workers 
in 1986 had moved above 95% of the median, compared with about 20% for the UK, Italy, 
Germany and France and 34% for Denmark. US low wage workers are noticeably more 
likely to stay low paid than are those in the other countries in the sample.  
Table 6 and Table 7 show the extent of earnings mobility for the selected countries, for the 
period 1986-91. Low wages are measured as being less than two thirds of median wages 
for full-time employees. The original data are derived from the OECD. Table 6 shows the 
extent of mobility for people who were employed full-time in both 1986 and 1991 and in 
1986 were in a low wage job. Table 7 includes all people who were employed in a low 
wage job in 1986. 
Table 6 shows how different are the mobility outcomes across the six countries for which 
there are data. The proportion of low paid full-time employees who stayed low paid varied 
from 8% in Denmark to 58% in the US. In Denmark, one third of workers moved from 
below 65% of the median to above 95%, within five years. In the US, only half as many 
did so. The other countries displayed degrees of mobility that lay between these 
extremes.  
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Table 6 - Transition rates into and out of minimum wage jobs, by years into career 
(%) 
                                        Low paid defined as below 0.65 median earnings 
  Below 0.65 median  0.65 to 0.95 median  Above 0.95 median 
Denmark 8.1  58.1  33.9 
France 31.6  48.2  20.2 
Germany 26.0  50.0  24.0 
Italy 21.8  58.3  19.9 
UK 39.0  39.9  21.1 
USA 58.1  25.6  16.3 
Source: Keese et al, 1998 
Table 7 - Five-year earnings mobility of low-paid workers: 1991 earnings status of 
1986 low-paid workers, including moves out of full-time employment (%) 
Low paid defined as below 0.65 median earnings 
  Not emp. full-time  Below 0.65 median  0.65 to 0.95 median  Above 0.95 median 
Denmark 25.7  6.0  43.1  25.2 
Germany  40.5 15.5 19.7 14.3 
Sweden  31.6 10.5 34.2 23.7 
USA  30.4 40.5 17.8 11.3 
Source: Keese et al, 1998 
Table 7 shows more broadly what happened to low paid full-time workers. It is striking that 
between a quarter (Denmark) and 40% (Germany) were not in full-time employment five 
years later. For the US, fully 70% of people employed full-time on low wages in 1986 were 
either not in full-time employment or were still in low wage jobs five years later. Upward 
mobility was a minority experience in the US and Germany, in clear contrast to Denmark 
and Sweden.  
Tables 6 and 7 raise the obvious question of whether there is a systematic link between 
the extent of cross-section inequality in pay and the extent of upward mobility of low paid 
workers. This question cannot be answered with confidence, since the number of 
countries for which there are comparable longitudinal mobility data is small. However, 
Figure 4 suggests that mobility is higher in countries with less cross-section inequality in 
pay, or at least no less. Where low pay is defined as below two thirds of the median, “ – a 
higher share of low-paid workers become trapped in countries where the pool of low-paid 
workers, in any single year, is larger.” (Keese et al :251). Note the first panel, where low 
wage is defined as having a wage in the bottom quintile, suggests that there is no clear 
relation between overall inequality and mobility. This measure of low pay is not affected by 
the degree of absolute inequality.  
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Notes:  (Y)   Probability a first quintile worker in 1986 had moved into a higher quintile in 1991. 
  (X)   Ratio of 90th to 10th percentile earnings, 1991. 
  (a)  The mobility of low-paid workers refers only to those workers employed full-time in 1986 and 1991. 






























Notes:  (Y)   Probability a worker earning below 0.65 of the median in 1986 was earning above 0.65 of the median in 1991. 
  (X)   Ratio of 90th to 10th percentile earnings 1991. 
  (a)  The mobility of low-paid workers refers only to those workers employed full-time in 1986 and 1991. 
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A more detailed look at mobility in France is presented in Bazen (2001). He uses labour 
force survey data to examine wage mobility for the whole French labour force. He finds 
that: 
•  Earnings mobility is higher for younger workers. 
•  There has been some fall in mobility between 1990 and 1997. 
•  Between 1995 and 1996, for workers aged under 30, 43% of first decile workers and 
35% of second decile workers moved to a higher decile. 
•  Over the two year period 1995-7, the comparable figures were 50 and 40%. 
•  Workers over 30 had a little less mobility than did the younger workers. 
•  Despite their higher mobility, in the mid-1990s nearly half of young people in the first 
decile of wages were still there two years later. 
8.5  Welfare to low wage jobs 
Lane and Stevens (2001) report a detailed look at the prospects for economic 
independence provided to welfare recipients by low wage jobs.  About half of welfare 
recipients (aged 18-65) in Baltimore found a job of any sort between July 1990 and 
September 1996. Only 18% of the total were able to obtain and hold jobs that paid 
sufficient to enable them to leave welfare benefits for any period between 1990-96. Those 
who did get work generally had short tenure, averaging 3 jobs in the period. Only 2,432 of 
the 24,631 jobs offered to (and taken by) welfare recipients, enabled the recipients to 
leave welfare, and only 4,662 lasted more than four quarters.  Jobs that enabled 
recipients to leave welfare were more likely to be in public administration, health services 
and social services, and to be in growing rather than shrinking firms. If anything, large 
firms were less likely to provide longer lasting jobs and those that permit an exit from 
welfare. Firms that have recent experience of hiring welfare recipients have better 
matches, in terms of duration.  
Overall, the conclusions from this important work are pessimistic about the capacity of low 
wage jobs to provide good exits from reliance on welfare, among American workers. This 
supports later evidence that shows the difficulty that sole mothers have in obtaining 
employment that is more satisfactory than even the very basic benefits available to them 
under the US welfare system. 
8.6  Summary of evidence on mobility 
We conclude from this review of the evidence on wage/earnings mobility that: 
•  There is considerable variation in the degree of wage mobility across selected OECD 
countries: policy probably matters. 
•  Countries with higher levels of cross-section earnings inequality have lower levels of 
upward wage mobility. 
•  The level of wage mobility among low wage workers is quite low in the UK and the 
US. 
•  Measures of mobility are sensitive to how low wage is defined and whether 
movement into non-employment or part-time employment is included: 
−  The stricter is the definition of low wage, the greater the mobility.  
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−  The inclusion of movement into non or part-time employment substantially 
reduces the degree of upward mobility. 
•  Quite a large fraction of low wage workers cycle between low wage jobs and no jobs. 
•  Mobility is higher, the longer the time interval considered. 
•  Youth have higher levels of upward mobility than do older workers. 
•  Upward mobility is higher for men than for women, and for more educated workers. 
•  Thus, for older, less educated and female workers, low wages are likely to be a trap 
rather than the first step on the ladder. 
•  At least in the US, UK and France, and probably more widely, earnings/wage mobility 
has fallen substantially over the 1980s and 90s. 
Note that the evidence on wage mobility that is cited above is derived from data which 
end, at the latest, in the mid-1990s. It is clear that mobility fell while (among English-
speaking countries at least) inequality of wages rose, in the period from the early 1980s 
until the early to mid 1990s. We do not know what has happened to mobility in the last few 
years. The strong labour market in the US in the second half of the 1990s may, for 
example, have reversed the trend to reducing mobility in that country.  
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9 Sole  mothers 
An important group that is particularly prone to low wages is mothers of young children, 
and sole mothers in particular. In this section, I set out what is known about the labour 
market experience of sole mothers, and their prospects for upward wage mobility. The 
questions are “What is the role of low-wage jobs as a pathway into paid employment for 
sole mothers? Do sole mothers get stuck in low-wage jobs indefinitely, or do low-wage 
jobs provide a ladder to work up to higher-wage jobs? Most of the information is taken 
from the US literature, with some also from Australia and Canada.  
There is a special social significance to the wage experience of sole mothers. First, they 
are responsible not just for themselves, but also for their children. Prospects for the 
mother affect prospects for the children. Evidence emerging from the US experiment with 
pushing sole mothers off welfare and into work is suggesting that the substitution of work 
for welfare, of itself, does little for children’s welfare. Only when mothers’ incomes rise do 
discernible benefits to children become evident (Savener et al, 2002:4). Second, the 
alternative to wage work for most sole mothers is social welfare support (though there is 
some financial support for the children provided by some fathers). The taxpayer therefore 
has an interest in the ability of sole mothers to find adequate employment, that enables 
them to become financially independent. The evidence of Lane and Stevens (2001) is that 
finding employment that provides financial independence is much harder than finding any 
employment. 
The number of sole mothers has grown dramatically in many OECD countries over the 
last 20 to 30 years. By 1998, 21% of all Australian families (with 18% of the children) were 
headed by a sole parent, and the vast majority (90%) of these sole parents are women 
(ABS, 1999). A similar growth in sole mothers has occurred in North America, to 23% in 
1998 (Horwitz and Scheid, 1999). Generally sole mothers comprise two main groups - 
older, divorced or separated women with two or three children of school age, and 
younger, never-married women who usually have just one child, often of pre-school age 
(McHugh and Millar, 1996). 
9.1  The labour force participation of sole mothers  
One possible way for sole mothers to improve their poor financial circumstances is to 
have higher wage income. In 1994, the split between economically active and inactive 
sole mothers was about 50:50 in Australia, whereas for married mothers the split is closer 
to 60:40 (McHugh and Millar, 1996). Similarly, in the US, married mothers have had a 
higher employment level than sole mothers since the early 1990's. In Germany however, 
married mothers exhibit consistently lower employment rates than lone mothers (Drobnic, 
2000). Despite about half of sole mothers not working, numerous studies have found that 
the vast majority of sole mothers would much prefer to work than receive welfare (Edin 
and Lein, 1997; McHugh and Millar, 1996; Youngblut, Brady, Thomas and Brooten, 2000). 
There are a number of reasons why sole mothers who want to work do not do so. They 
include the level and availability of income support payments; the care needs of young 
children, access to jobs, attainable wage rates and the availability and affordability of child 
care (Ross and Saunders, 1990).  
Unemployment is generally more of a problem for sole mothers than for married mothers. 
In 1995, 20% of never-married American mothers with pre-school children were  
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unemployed, compared to 5% of married mothers with pre-school children (Drobnic, 
2000). Despite this, the inability to get a job is not the major problem of labour force 
participation for sole mothers  (Harris, 1993, 1996; McHugh and Millar, 1996; Spalter-Roth 
et al 1995). Rather, the potential wage that a sole mother can earn is the major 
determinant of whether she will participate in the labour force or not. If a sole mother 
cannot find a job with wages, benefits and working conditions that outweigh the difference 
between welfare benefits and the costs of childcare, she has little economic incentive to 
enter the labour market. Jencks (1994) argues that sole mothers do not turn to welfare 
because they are unusually reluctant to work or prefer hand-outs, rather they turn to 
welfare because they cannot get jobs that pay better than welfare. The general belief of 
researchers throughout the late 20
th century was that employment provided no exit from 
poverty for most sole mothers because the jobs available to them were predominantly and 
persistently low wage positions (eg, Mann and Albelda, 1989).  
A considerable body of research appears to confirm these expectations about the role of 
low wage work for sole mothers.  First, the types of occupations which are available to 
sole mothers are predominantly characterised by low wages. Sole mothers, (even those 
who participate in schemes designed to help sole mothers find work, such as Jobs, 
Education and Training (JET) in Australia), end up employed in traditional women’s 
occupations, such as hospitality, retail, factory work, secretarial work, cleaning, and child-
minding, (Edin and Lein, 1997; Leung, 1998; Mulroy, 1995). Spalter-Roth, Burr, Hartmann 
and Shaw (1995) found in a two year longitudinal study of welfare-reliant mothers in the 
US that 7 in 10 single welfare-recipients reported some participation in the labour force 
during the 2-year period, but that these jobs were concentrated in the lowest rungs of the 
occupational ladder (39% worked as maids, cashiers, nurse's aides, child care workers or 
waitresses). Among working sole mothers in Brooks and Buckner’s (1996) study, cashier 
and food service were the most common jobs (75%), with only 3.2% working in 
management positions. Furthermore, 57% of the working sole mothers worked in part-
time jobs.  
Thus the types of unskilled occupations typically held by sole mothers tend to be part-
time, offer low wages, few if any benefits like health coverage, no paid leave, have 
unpredictable and limited hours, low status, and be insecure, temporary and casual 
(Avison, 1997; Brown and Moran, 1997; DeBord et al 2000; Department of Social 
Security, 1992; Edin and Lein, 1997; Leung, 1998; Lipman, Offord and Boyle, 1997; 
Mulroy, 1995; Spalter-Roth et al, 1995). These jobs held by sole mothers have also been 
found to offer few rewards for education or years on the job, short duration (averaging 
only about 1.8 years) and few opportunities for advancement (Brooks and Buckner, 1996; 
DeBord et al 2000; Mulroy, 1995).  
Research suggests that many sole mothers cease working because the low-wage jobs 
they obtain often make them worse off financially than they would be if they remained on 
welfare. The most prominent study conducted in this area was by Edin and Lein (1997).  
In the early, 1990s, Edin and Lein interviewed 214 poor sole mothers who were welfare 
recipients and 165 poor sole mothers who worked mostly in unskilled jobs, all from the 
US. They found that these sole mothers had to choose between a welfare system that 
paid far too little to provide for their basic needs, and a labour market that offered them 
little more than they could have received by staying home. Wage-reliant mothers faced 
the largest gap between their income and expenses. Their material hardship rates 
reflected this large gap: wage-reliant mothers reported experiencing more material 
hardship than those who relied primarily on welfare. Those who worked usually fared 
worse than those on welfare because the government took so much back from workers 
and because no matter how hard life was on welfare, it was more stable than the low- 
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wage, unskilled employment that characterised these sole mothers. Many of the wage-
reliant sole mothers in Edin and Lein's study said that they were no better off financially 
than they would have been on welfare, that there was little prospect of promotion in their 
jobs, there were few rewards for job experience, their employers rarely offered any 
training or education, that they worked in industries characterised by unstable 
employment, and that working full-time placed substantial strains on their ability to be a 
good parent.  
Edin and Lein (1997) concluded that there were a number of sound reasons why welfare-
reliant sole mothers were better off not looking for work. One of them was that, no matter 
how long they stayed at a job and no matter how diligently they worked, jobs in what some 
called “the five-dollar-an-hour ghetto” rarely led to better jobs over time.  
Other researchers have obtained findings corresponding to those of Edin and Lein (1997). 
Using both national data and qualitative data from a sample of diverse sole mothers (not 
just poor sole mothers like Edin and Lein sampled), Mulroy (1995) found that about 60% 
of all employed sole mothers were poor, because the types of jobs available to them were 
generally low-wage, part-time and temporary. In their analysis of unemployment and 
earnings data for sole mothers in Vermont, USA, McCrate and Smith (1998) also found 
that the major cause of sole mother's predicament was scarce job opportunities and low 
wage jobs that do not provide economic security. Further, an Australian study of sole 
mothers by Shaver, King, McHugh and Payne (1994) examined older Jobs, Education and 
Training participants whose youngest child was about to turn 16 and who were thus about 
to lose the sole parent pension. They found that a year after the pension ceased, almost a 
third of the sample still had no paid work and more than half of the women in the study 
reported lower incomes after the transition off the pension than before, because their jobs 
were predominantly low-wage, casual and temporary.  
The welfare reform in the US during the late 1990's (Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families) was implemented due to the belief that this change would eliminate the “welfare 
trap”, where sole mothers were better off on welfare. In line with this belief, a recent study 
conducted after the implementation of welfare reform in the US found results contrasting 
with those of Edin and Lein (1997). Danziger, Heflin and Corcoran (2000) found in a 
sample of sole mothers who received welfare in 1997, those who left welfare to work or 
who combined work with welfare were financially better off, on average, than those who 
remained on the welfare caseload. Those who worked had higher household incomes and 
experienced less material hardship than did non-working welfare recipients. They 
concluded the raised income gain now associated with moving from welfare to work was 
partially due to the economic boom of the 1990's producing a higher minimum wage, and 
the increases in benefits that supplement the earnings and subsidise the work expenses 
of the low wage workers. Nonetheless, Danziger et al (2000) had some findings that were 
consistent with Edin and Lien (1997). Many working mothers could not make ends meet 
on their wage alone; they continued to rely on government assistance (eg, food stamps), 
and contributions from family and friends.  
9.2  Is there upward mobility for sole mothers in low-wage 
work? 
Kalil, Corcoran, Danziger, Tolman, Seefeldt, Rosen and Nam (1998) state that virtually all 
participants in the (US) welfare debate agree that in the first period after leaving welfare, 
recipients will work at low-wage jobs ($5 to $6 an hour). But the hope is that as welfare  
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recipients gain work experience, their wages will grow and they will eventually earn 
enough to support their families.  
Burtless (1995) examined longitudinal data spanning 12 years and found that earnings 
growth is very slow both for welfare mothers and for mothers who do not receive welfare 
but are high school dropouts. Wages grew less than 1% per year for welfare mothers 
whereas wages grew 4.8% for women who did not receive welfare during 1979-1991. 
Burtless (1995) also found that 50% of all sole mothers on welfare had fewer than 12 
years of education. Among these poorly educated women who have received welfare 
payments at some point during the 12 years, their wages grew by only 6 cents per hour 
per year. This seems to suggest that low-wage jobs did not provide a ladder to work up to 
higher-wage jobs for these sole mothers. Kalil et al (1998) conclude from their literature 
review that getting welfare recipients a job is only the first step in moving them to self-
sufficiency, because welfare recipients have a hard time keeping jobs, and their wages 
grow slowly, if at all, over time.  
The lack of advancement provided by the low-wage jobs that sole mothers typically have 
is also demonstrated by the cycling between welfare and work which characterises many 
sole mothers. Handler (1995) claims that low-wage work with limited benefits accounts for 
numerous exits from and returns to welfare. Indeed, research has shown that over the last 
few decades, many unskilled and semi-skilled sole mothers have cycled between welfare 
and work (Harris, 1993). Many welfare recipients in the US attempt to exit welfare 
dependency via work. However for a variety of reasons, such as a lack of health care, the 
cost of child care, low wages, and jobs that do not last, many of these sole mothers who 
make the transition from welfare to work end up returning to welfare (Greenberg, 1993). 
Harris (1993) found by analysing longitudinal data that more than half of welfare recipients 
leave welfare for work during the first year of receiving benefits. The problem however 
was that many also return, and then they try again and again. There was significant 
movement between welfare and work. Harris (1993) estimated that nearly one-quarter of 
all sole mothers who exit welfare for work return to welfare within one year, 35% within 2 
years and 54% within 6 years. Subsequent exits from welfare are also rapid: half leave 
welfare again within 12 months of their return. Some of them then return to welfare yet 
again. Harris' (1996) later research concluded that the problem for sole mothers is not 
usually finding a job, the problem is keeping that job and staying off welfare - in this study 
about 25 to 40% of all sole mothers who leave welfare via work return to welfare within 1 
year, and up to 70% return within 5 years (Harris, 1996). However, sole mothers with 
more than 12 years of schooling, with prior work experience, and with fewer children are 
less likely to return to welfare. 
For the majority of sole mothers, low-wage work provides the only entry point into paid 
employment, because (at least in the US, where most of this research has been 
conducted) most sole mothers lack the education necessary for higher-wage jobs. Thus, 
low-wage work plays a major role in the labour force participation of sole mothers. But 
these low-wage jobs do not provide a pathway into higher-wage jobs. Instead, sole 
mothers appear to become stuck in low-wage jobs indefinitely, because these jobs do not 
provide opportunities for skill development. As a result of this lack of opportunity for on-
the-job learning, and because low wage jobs involve considerable insecurity, many sole 
mothers give up and return to government benefits, if they are able to.   
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10  Sources of upward wage mobility 
The studies of wage mobility reported above include some evidence on the attributes of 
workers that contribute to an increased likelihood of upward mobility.  
The evidence cited so far gives a reasonable idea about the extent of upward wage 
mobility among low wage workers. While there clearly is mobility, especially for younger 
workers, there is also a deal of stability. Older, less educated, female, rural and displaced 
workers have the lowest prospects of upward mobility. Mobility to a higher paying job is 
much less if movement out of a job (or a full-time job) is included. It is interesting, then, to 
ask what is known about the conditions that increase upward mobility. 
Dunlop (2000) examines the rates of transition from a low wage job to a higher paying job 
across a range of personal and work attributes. She reports (for Australia) that those with 
the lowest prospects of upward mobility are women with dependent children, older 
workers, rural workers, part-time and casual workers and non-union members who work in 
a small private sector firm. A logit estimate of the determinants of moving above the low 
wage threshold for Australian workers concluded that young male urban low wage 
workers were the most likely to be upwardly mobile. However, workers employed by small 
firms were significantly less likely to move to a higher wage in the next period. This is 
most sensibly interpreted to mean that such firms do not provide systematic on-the-job 
training or do not have promotion ladders that provide wage growth within the firm. This 
finding is consistent with that for the UK (Stewart and Swaffield, 1997; Sloane and 
Theodossious, 1994). It should also be noted that having undertaken training in the 
previous year was not significantly associated with the probability of moving to a higher 
wage (Dunlop,2000: 38). 
10.1  The economic environment 
There is tentative evidence that the state of the macro-economy has some impact on 
wage mobility. The form this takes is not so much immediate wage changes (at least in 
the US, over recent decades wages have not moved much in response to macro-
economic conditions). Rather, the evidence suggests that to a modest extent a strong 
labour market encourages the growth of jobs in industries and occupations that have 
promotion possibilities. The existence of promotion ladders is indicated by the evidence 
that people with longer tenure in the occupation or industry have higher wages, other 
things equal. The return to tenure varies considerably across industries. For example, 
Hines, Hoynes and Krueger et al (2001) calculate a return to tenure in the US of virtually 
zero for Entertainment, Recreation, Mining and Personal Services industries, while the 
return was as high as 2.8% per year for Finance, Insurance and Real Estate. Similarly, the 
returns to tenure varied from zero for farmers to 2.2% per year for professional and 
technical workers. The question is, do people shift into occupations or industries with 
higher returns to tenure as the labour market moves in favour of workers? Hines et al 
conclude that as the macro-economy tightens, there is some evidence that workers, 
especially the lower paid, do shift into industries with career paths. A tight labour market is 
beneficial for low skilled workers primarily because it increases the probability of them 
getting a job, and of being able to work longer hours. But it seems that it is also of some 
benefit in increasing the chances of low skilled workers finding jobs that offer opportunities 
for advancement.  
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We note, however, that a strong macro-economy may not by itself be able to overcome 
serious labour market disadvantage. The 1990s boom in the US has indeed resulted in a 
fall in the level of unemployment among young black men (from 43 to 30% during 1985-
98). However, their level of employment actually fell from 34 to 30% during the same 
period. (Ryan 2001:41). Indeed, by 2000, more young black men were in gaol than in full-
time work.  
The value of a tight labour market is also supported by the evidence (eg, De Grip and 
Nekkers, 2001; Gottschalk, 2001) that voluntary job changes on average result in a gain in 
wages whereas involuntary ones typically cause a loss in wages. Since it is low wage 
workers who are most at risk of losing their jobs in a recession, they face a double 
jeopardy: of both job loss and of wage loss if they are able to find another job. 
10.2 Job  matching 
The theoretical framework for analysing job mobility lies partially within models of job-
search and job matching.  
Several authors have developed variations of such models, which we will not review here. 
But as an example, Pissarides’ (1994) model distinguishes between good jobs and bad 
jobs, and depicts a situation where firm’s output and employees’ wages are a positive 
function of firm-specific human capital. In this model, firms invest in employees’ training in 
skills specific to the business of the firms, and reward the acquired skills by higher wages. 
Good jobs are those that offer such training and advancement opportunities, while bad 
jobs do not. Low paid jobs are initially a combination of good and bad jobs. Connolly and 
Gottschalk (2001) extend the idea of a good job that is low paid to include one which 
improves the range of job offers that the employee will face in the future. 
Mortenson and Pissarides (1999: 2619) conclude that current state of the art of modelling 
of job matching produces the conclusion that  
. . .wage dispersion can induce endogenous differentials in labor productivity rather 
than simply reflect exogenous differences--an employer offering a higher wage has an 
[sic] greater incentive to make match specific productivity enhancing investments 
because the future return on the investment is subject to a less quit risk. 
One implication of Pissarides’ and other such models is that good entry jobs are more 
competitive because they are sought after, not only by unemployed people, but also by 
employed people already in bad jobs or in good jobs to which they are mismatched (on-
the-job search). This “sorting” is confirmed by Blanchard and Diamond (1994). Where 
there is structural unemployment (ie, the number of applicants is higher than the number 
of vacancies), other things equal, the already employed will generally be preferred to the 
unemployed applicant. Blanchard and Diamond (1994) speculate that this may be caused 
by the fact that many firms believe that unemployment duration either signals or causes 
“below average skills or work ethic”. If we adopt the interpretation of Blanchard and 
Diamond, then the most likely upward mobility path of a previously unemployed and 
unskilled person is:   
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(0) Unemployment  
(1) Bad entry job  
(2) (Non-matching good entry job) 
(3) Matching good entry job 
(4) High wage/skills job after training  
Starting from unemployment, an unskilled job seeker has little chance of finding a “good 
entry job”. This is because these jobs are sought after by people in other “good jobs”, 
which do not match their interest, as well as those in “bad entry jobs”. Because these two 
groups have more experience and do not carry the negative signal of being unemployed, 
their chances of getting the job, other things equal, are higher. So, the unskilled job 
seeker would start with a “bad job”. From the “bad job”, the worker has better chances 
than an unemployed job seeker, of shifting to a “good entry job” and growing from there. 
There is a possibility that the worker may not find a good job match at first. In this case, 
the worker engages in on-the-job search until a match is found. Subsequent wage growth 
would then occur through obtaining a better match, and through training and promotion. 
This is the optimistic scenario. The pessimistic scenario can be either no job or getting 
stuck in a bad entry job, or some combination of the two (moving between bad jobs and 
unemployment/non-employment). This general process is supported by the work of Gregg 
and Wadsworth (2000). They find that for UK workers, people who enter a new job from 
previous employment earn substantially more, other things equal, than people who enter a 
new job from non-employment. 
Note that even the skilled unemployed might find it rational to go through this pathway, if 
there is structural unemployment. This might happen to previously employed parents after 
a period out of the labour force to care for children, or to displaced workers. 
Job mobility and wage mobility are two intrinsically different phenomena, although they 
are related. An employee can move up or down the wage ladder without changing 
employer. And a worker can change employer without changing wage. Gottschalk (2001) 
provides evidence that both of these things happen: indeed, real wages rise, fall and stay 
the same for workers who stay in their job and for those who move. The relation between 
job change and wage change is quite complex, and the average relation between job 
mobility and wage mobility conceals as much as it reveals. Despite this complexity, there 
is consistent evidence that people who change jobs voluntarily (and go straight to a new 
job) on average experience a rise in pay. For low skilled workers, there is some evidence 
that a job change that also involves a move to a different industry is the most beneficial 
strategy (they have little specific capital to lose by such a move). Staying in one’s current 
job is on average not the best strategy for obtaining a wage rise for low skilled people. (De 
Grip and Nekkers, 2001).  
On average a voluntary move to a new employer is associated with the higher wage gain 
than staying with the same employer. For women in the US the gain from staying was 
typically 3.2% (2.0% for men). On shifting voluntarily (ie, obtaining a better match), women 
gained an immediate 1.7% average wage increase and men an immediate 3.1% increase. 
(Gottschalk, 2001:11). These, however, are average figures. For low education (the 
nearest we can get to low wage) workers, the gain from a better job match (and the gain 
from staying with the current employer) was substantially less for men who had not 
completed secondary school than for college graduates. However, the relative gain of  
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moving voluntarily compared with staying was similar for the two education groups. For 
women, it is a different story. Low education women gain almost as much (in percentage 
terms) from a voluntary job shift as do high education women (about a 4% wage gain). In 
contrast, low education women face very low (1%) wage gains on the job compared with 
7.5% for college educated women. This suggests that for low wage women, searching for 
a better job match is a superior strategy for obtaining a wage rise than staying with their 
current employer. The advantage of searching for a better job match is much less 
apparent for low education men.  
Gottschalk, 2001, emphasises that the average experience conceals a great deal of 
diversity. While on average a move direct to a new job increases the wage, for many it 
does not. About half of both men and women who had not completed secondary school 
experienced a drop in their wage on moving direct from one job to another. If the job move 
was involuntary for low education workers (as indicated by a spell of unemployment in 
between), then the new job on average had a lower wage than the initial job and almost 
60% experienced a fall in their wage. 
Efficient job matching requires that there is no discrimination. The evidence for state 
dependence provided in, eg, Stewart and Swaffield (1999) and Stewart (2002) suggests 
that employers use employment in a low paid job as a signal—perhaps of low productivity, 
perhaps of a propensity to high turnover. Other things being equal, (eg, education, 
experience, gender) they are therefore reluctant to employ a person who has been in a 
low wage job for reasons that may not truly reflect the worker’s potential productivity in the 
job. 
10.2.1 Choosing the right employer 
Employers do matter. If the structure of employment is such that a high proportion of jobs 
is low wage/low skill, then upward mobility will be the more difficult. Davis (2001) argues 
that a competitive market with decentralised search for job matches between firms and 
workers will lead to a proportion of low skill jobs that is inefficiently high. This in turn is 
highly likely to reduce overall wage mobility.  
Lane and Stevens (2001), show that the characteristics of the employer do affect the 
likelihood of a worker of given characteristics having low wages. Workers with poor 
characteristics tend to be employed a) with other like workers and b) by firms that, ceteris 
paribus, pay relatively low wages. There are low paying firms within industries, and low 
paying industries (especially food and drink, retail, business services, personal services). 
Firms that run a high turnover policy particularly harm low wage/skill workers, because the 
damage to them in terms of getting another job, wage loss and hours loss from losing their 
job is greater than for more skilled workers. 
Some recent formal search models incorporate heterogeneity among both workers and 
employers in identifying the rational maximising equilibrium. Bowlus, Keifer and Neumann 
(1995, 1997) allow productivity among otherwise similar employers to vary across a small 
number of employer types. One conclusion from their simulations (based on US 
parameters) is that the reason that the earnings distribution of young whites entering the 
labour market from school is higher than for blacks is not because whites get more or 
different job offers, but because the jobs that blacks get are twice as likely to disappear 
from under them. The empirical evidence is strong that involuntary job change is linked 
with (probably causes) reduced wages.  
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Bontemps Robin and Van den Berg (1997), using French data, also permit the productivity 
of different employers to vary. They conclude that the most productive employers have 
substantial monopsony power and use it to pay wages well below marginal product. The 
least productive employers have little monopsony power and only normal profit and are 
forced to pay approximately marginal product. The former result implies that wage 
regulation that increases wages above that set by the monopsonists, but not above 
marginal product, would both raise wages and raise employment (using the well-known 
result of the monopsony model of labour demand, in which mandated (but not market-
determined) increases in the wage can have the effect of both increasing the wage and 
increasing employment).  
There is an important conclusion from this body of research for the role of low wage jobs. 
Low wage jobs mostly provide relatively little training and are offered by low productivity 
firms. The greatest chance of upward mobility for a relatively low skill worker is to get a job 
with a high productivity firm that is paying relatively high wages (hence faces relatively low 
quit rates). As a result of the low quit rates, this firm will be prepared to pay for skills 
development of its workers, and hence provide the conditions for upward wage mobility. 
But this works only if there are also lower wage jobs out there, since it is the higher 
relative wage of the high productivity firm that induces the lower quit rate. If higher wages 
at the bottom were mandated, then they may reduce quits to leave the labour force, but 
not quits to go to a better job. Hence there would be some expectation of greater 
employer investment in skills development, but not as great as for the same wage seen as 
part of a distribution, with sizeable numbers of jobs offering less. 
10.2.2 On-the-job training 
It seems clear that there are two main ways in which people can move from low paid to 
higher paid jobs. One is to obtain a better job match, through moving to a new job, which 
we have discussed in the previous section. The other is to gain additional skills.  There is 
good evidence that skills learned on the job are a large part of most people’s stock of 
human capital (eg,  see OECD, 1991, Lynch, 1994, Brunello and Medio, 2001). These 
skills can be acquired through formal, off-the-job courses, or they can be acquired through 
learning on-the-job. The latter requires that the employer has an interest in the skills 
development of their workers, and that the job being done has scope for learning.  
Traditionally, economists have estimated the value of skills learned on the job by 
estimating the returns to general labour market experience and to tenure with the firm. 
Measured thus, there is a great deal of skills development acquired on the job, though the 
amount varies systematically across firms, industries and occupations and by firm size.  
While the positive empirical link between wages and experience/tenure is clear, it is 
difficult to know the real causal link between training and wage outcomes. Empirical work 
in this area is beset with problems of selection bias. And  
. . . the complexity of the causal process is such that simple statistical analyses can 
give misleading results.  The associated problems of simultaneity and heterogeneity 
for the estimation of statistical models of the causal process are severe. 
Elias, 1998:3 
While there is a positive correlation between training and earnings and a negative 
correlation between training and mobility, it is hard to identify the direction of causation. It 
may be that the people who get the training are those who any way have higher ability  
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(hence a greater capacity to learn). What is seen as a return to training is in part then a 
return to ability. While the training and the associated rise in pay may cause the observed 
reduced mobility, it may also be that training decreases job mobility, thereby increasing 
earnings. This same identification problem besets efforts to estimate the returns to formal 
education.  
A further hypothesis is that worker quality may be difficult to observe, ex ante, so that 
firms that need high-quality workers want to retain workers who they learn are high quality 
in order to avoid the risk of hiring a series of low-quality workers before finding another 
high-quality worker. Or it may be that many workers prefer long-term stable employment 
relationships and are more willing to supply effort in such situations (Farber, 1999:2479). 
Longitudinal studies are an important tool for unraveling cause and effect. There are as 
yet not many such studies that have been applied to sorting out the causal contribution of 
on-the-job training to wage mobility. 
Elias (1998) is one such study, though it has limitations. To unravel these relations, he 
draws on data recording month by month training, earnings, and labour force status of 
British young people (aged 19 and 20) who had finished full-time education and not gone 
to university. He concludes:  
•  Formal training has strong positive effects on tenure and negative effects on earnings 
(as youth pay for part of their general skills?). 
•  Informal training was widespread, but not systematically associated with earnings or 
tenure, except “having someone responsible for seeing that one’s training needs are 
met tends to decrease the likelihood of a job terminating.” (p 20). 
Lynch (1991) followed 5 waves of US school leavers who left school in the years 1979-83 
and obtained a job in the first year after permanently leaving school. These young people 
were followed for four years, to assess the impact of training on the probability of leaving 
their first job. Three quarters left their first job within four years, and the average duration 
of each job was about one and a half years. College graduates were much more likely to 
receive on the job training than were school leavers. School leavers and women were 
more likely to get some off the job training. Neither on nor off the job training had a 
significant effect on job duration for men. For women, on the job training decreased and 
off the job training increased turnover.  
Company training in the United States is firm-specific, even for young workers in their 
first job. Young workers entering the labor market can receive both good and bad 
draws from the labor market. There are some workers who get a bad draw who 
appear to move to better employment by investing in off-the-job training. Those in 
good jobs are more likely to obtain on-the-job training that results in higher wages and 
a lower probability of leaving the firm. These effects are particularly strong for women. 
Lynch,1991:155 
Firms are likely to have some discretion in whether to choose a low turnover, high training 
policy as compared with a high turnover, low training policy.  Society is not indifferent to 
this choice, as it has considerable consequences for the level of skills, the profile of 
earnings and the extent of wage mobility of the workers employed by those firms.   
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An important direction for future research will be to investigate variation in the tenure 
earnings profile and relate it to the underlying economic forces that cause firms to 
make different decisions regarding their compensation structure. 
Farber,1999: 2474 
Several empirical studies show a negative correlation between average wages, on-the-job 
training and turnover rates. That is, people who earn lower wages are likely to have higher 
rates of job change and lower levels of on-the-job training. Not all of this will be voluntary. 
The result holds across industries and across occupations (see Neal,1999, for a review of 
relevant literature, and Parent,1999). To explain this, Neal (1997) uses data from the US 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), to show that expected returns from job 
specific training fall with declines in worker ability. This is true for both the worker and the 
firm. Thus, firms screen the workers to determine those with the highest ability for training 
in specific skills because they have a comparative advantage in specialised jobs and firms 
expect higher return on training investment from them. In turn, workers with higher ability 
face high mobility costs and therefore stay longer in their jobs. Conversely, workers with 
lower ability receive less on-the-job training, hence lower mobility costs and more rapid 
turnover. This turnover reinforces the reluctance of the employer to invest in their skills. 
Within this broad understanding, it is clear that national variation in culture and institutions 
affects the nature and amount of on the job learning that occurs, especially for new 
entrants. In the US, it is expected that people manage their own transition to work, and 
their subsequent careers. Some private firms are now emerging that tailor work placement 
and related instruction for individuals to assist them in this transition (as do Job Network 
providers in Australia). Zemsky, Shapiro, Iannozzi, Cappelli and Bailey (1998) describe 
the US approach as follows: “There remains an almost dizzying reliance on the ad hoc 
and experimental - on political and educational arrangements that depend on temporary 
networks and convenient alliances as much as formal authority”. (p 3).  
At the other end of the scale sit Germany and Japan. These countries have highly 
structured links between schools, employers and vocational education that provide clear 
pathways from school into employment. Ryan (2001) concludes that in Germany 
apprenticeship “opens up to young Germans skilled occupations and high wage 
employers that remain closed off in countries that lack mass work-based vocational 
preparation.” (p 58).The OECD (1993) reports that in Japan about 80% of workers with 
less than one year of tenure received formal job training whereas the comparable figure 
for the US was 10%. When informal training is included, the differences are smaller, but 
still substantial (90% for large Japanese firms compared to 50% for large US firms). 
Compared to Germany and Japan, the US has a higher inflow rate both into and out of 
unemployment, and relatively efficient job matching processes. Brunello and Medio (2001) 
argue that this helps to explain why firm-provided training in the US is relatively low: it is 
more efficient for firms to recruit the skills they need than to develop them among their 
existing workers. Freeman (1995:7), after a careful comparison of Germany, Japan and 
the US, concludes that “considerable institutional structure is needed to induce firms to 
provide training to workers.” Germany places a deal of emphasis (and resources) on the 
provision of formal apprenticeship in a wide range of occupations. One result is that young 
German men who leave school early have about 4.4 years of employment in their first 5 
years after school, compared with 3.3 years for young men in the US (see Durand-
Drouhin et al, 1998). This early employment is a key to future success. Quoting earlier 
work done by the OECD, Durand-Drouhin, McKenzie, and Sweet conclude that “How 
quickly young people find their first job after leaving school has a powerful effect on their  
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employment and career prospects and a poor start in the labour market can be difficult to 
overcome.”  
This powerful effect of early experience is especially important in the light of the 
conclusion of Zemsky et al (1998), that in the US there has been “a dramatic decline in 
entry-level jobs offering steady advancement and stability. Employers are dismantling 
internal career ladders and are beginning to withdraw offers to employees of long-term 
jobs and substantial investments in employee education and training.” (p 27). This 
suggests that, if firms are to be induced to provide on-the-job training to low skill workers, 
they will need some incentive from government or some moral suasion. 
While rationality and perfect markets imply that firms only invest in firm-specific training, it 
has been shown that, in the reality of imperfect labour markets, firms are willing to bear 
some of the general training costs. For example, Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) present a 
model where firms provide and pay for general training. The presence of market frictions 
make it possible for firms to make what would be general skills de facto specific skills.  
Again, however, the extent of and/or return to skills learned on the job are less for people 
with lower levels of formal education (Bazen (2001); De Grip and Nekkers (2001)). Van 
Opstal, Waaijers and Wiggers (1998) conclude that in the Netherlands, tenure is relatively 
more important than general experience for the wages of low skilled workers.  
The opportunity to move up the wage ladder through on-the-job training or job mobility 
differs systematically among low wage workers. Young people with more education are 
the ones most likely to be able to take advantage of these escape routes, especially if 
they are male. Older workers, adult women and the least educated have much poorer 
prospects. Older workers who have lost reasonably well paid jobs face substantial wages 
losses that last for a long time—indicating that training and mobility are not effective 
pathways for them (Podgursky and Swaim 1987, OECD, 1997). 
10.3  Personal characteristics and mobility 
The personal characteristics that economists focus on when explaining wage mobility are 
overwhelmingly those that may be characterised as dimensions of human capital. Indeed, 
the theoretical and empirical traction that can be obtained from the notion of human 
capital has overpowered other lines of thinking about the sources of advantage and 
disadvantage. Thus there is not much literature on the link between, say, family 
background and wage mobility. Earnings equations routinely include human capital 
measures such as formal education, years of employment experience (and tenure) and 
sex as explanators of differences in wages, if not of wage mobility directly. In some 
countries, notably the US, race is also included. The outcomes of such estimations 
systematically find that, in addition to the human capital variables, sex and race have 
significant effects on wages. Specifically, women earn less than men, and minorities earn 
less than whites, in Western countries (with the occasional exception of Asians). In the 
US, the group that fares worst in the labour market, and by inference in wage mobility, is 
young black men with little formal education. In France, the group with the worst wage and 
employment prospects is young unqualified women. Ryan (2001:44) concludes that   
. . . while disadvantage runs along similar lines in all countries, the distance that it 
travels, particularly along the tracks of ethnicity and scholastic achievement, is greater 
in the United States and the United Kingdom.  
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There is strong evidence that recent rising wage inequality is predominantly to be found 
within groups of workers who have the same observable characteristics (of education, 
sex, experience etc). This has caused economists at least to acknowledge that personal 
attributes of motivation, ability, personality, character and appearance are probably 
important in affecting wages and employment. But they have yet to delve deeply into what 
is still largely a black box. 
There is, however, an interesting literature on the role of physical appearance in affecting 
wages. Again, this is not directly linked to wage mobility, but the literature concludes that 
more beautiful and physically attractive people have higher earnings, other things equal.  
Harper (2000:771), for example, using longitudinal data from the UK Household Panel 
Survey, finds that  
. . . physical appearance has a substantial effect on earnings and employment 
patterns for both men and women. Irrespective of gender, those who are assessed as 
unattractive or short, experience a significant earnings penalty. Tall men receive a pay 
premium while obese women experience a pay penalty. The bulk of the pay 
differential for appearance arises from employer discrimination, although we find 
evidence for productivity differences among occupations. 
Pfann, Bosman, Biddle and Hamermesh (2000) conclude that Dutch firms that have more 
beautiful executives are thereby more profitable and pay their executives more. It might be 
reasonable to infer that attractive low wage workers are more likely to be upwardly mobile 
than unattractive ones. 
Psychologists conclude that there are strong interconnections between what happens 
within the individual on a psychological level and what happens in the social environment 
within which they grow up and develop throughout their life-course (Weiten, 1995). Both 
environmental and social factors are expected to be predictors of subsequent employment 
status. These factors include demographic background variables (such as gender, 
geographical location, ethnicity, type of school attended, and socio-economic-status 
[SES]), and family background and peer variables (such as family dysfunction, family 
structure, parent's educational and occupational status, and peer relationships). Personal 
psychological factors that are expected to affect subsequent employment status include 
personality variables (such as self-esteem, locus of control, vocational identity, 
achievement motivation, attitudes to work, and optimism); mental health and behavioural 
variables (such as depression, delinquency, drug use and abuse); and 
intellectual/cognitive variables (such as cognitive ability, IQ scores, school performance, 
educational attainment and job-seeking skills).  
These social and psychological factors are expected to influence the level of educational 
attainment obtained and the amount of job seeking activities, which in turn will determine 
the subsequent employment status. (Kokko, Pulkkinen and Puustinen, 2000; Lynd-
Stevenson, 1999; Lynn, Hampson and Magee, 1984; Winefield, Tiggerman, Winefield and 
Goldney 1993). This suggests a mediating effect of educational attainment and job-
seeking behaviour. The suggested links are highly plausible. The main contribution that 
careful empirical research can make is to quantify the size of the expected effects. As in 
most areas of policy, the key question is whether the factor in question has a large or a 
small effect on outcomes. The psychology literature is much better at identifying 
statistically significant causal relations than it is at identifying the magnitude of the effects 
in question.  
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We could find no psychological literature that tried to explain what caused some people to 
end up in low wage jobs. The nearest equivalent is the literature on what causes some 
people to be unemployed. We only report findings from longitudinal studies because 
causal conclusions about the relation between psychological variables and employment 
status can not be drawn from lesser studies. With a few exceptions (Leana and Feldman, 
1995, Lynd-Stevenson, 1999), much of this research has investigated youth during their 
transition between school and employment, where the aim has been to predict, on the 
basis of information gathered at school age, who will subsequently end up unemployed 
and who will succeed in finding employment (Kokko et al 2000).  
Demographic factors that have been found to predict subsequent employment status 
include type of school attended (Sanford, Offord, McLeod and Boyle 1994; Winefield et al 
1993; Woodward and Fergusson, 2000); and ethnicity (Winefield et al 1993). Minority 
ethnicity youth from lower SES backgrounds who attended public schools are at higher 
risk for subsequent unemployment. 
Family factors that have been found to predict subsequent unemployment include family 
dysfunction; growing up in a single parent family; lower status occupation and 
qualifications of parents; and unemployment in the family. Peer relationship problems 
stemming back into childhood are also predictors of youth unemployment (Caspi, Wright, 
Moffitt and Silva 1998, De-Goede, Spruijt, Mass and Duindam 2000; Winefield et al 1993, 
Woodward and Fergusson, 2000). 
Personality factors that have been found to predict subsequent employment status include 
lower achievement motivation and aspirations (Capsi et al 1998; Winefield et al 1993); 
poor conscientiousness (De Fruyt and Mervielde, 1999); and how important having a job 
is to the individual (“work ethic”) (Feather, 1986; Lynd-Stevenson, 1999). Other 
personality precursors to unemployment generally involve certain ways of thinking which 
characterise personalities. These predictors include hopelessness about job prospects; 
lower self-efficacy or sense of competence; lower level of optimism; higher level of self-
blame; poorer coping skills, external locus of control; poor control of emotions; passivity 
and; lower levels of extraversion; and poor identity development.
3
 
Mental health factors that have been found to predict subsequent employment status 
include diagnosis of a major psychiatric disorder before the age of 16; psychoticism; 
greater perceptions of stress; neuroticism, anxiety and nervousness problems; more 
depressive affect; lower life satisfaction; antisocial, aggressive, and deviant behaviour; 
drug (ab)use; and attentional deficits
4 
. 
Intellectual/cognitive factors that have been found to predict subsequent employment 
status include the level of intelligence; level of academic potential; reading skills; high 
school grades; and cognitive development 
5
. Individuals with lower IQs, poor reading 
skills, lower school performance and academic potential, and slower cognitive 
development thus tend to be at greater risk for subsequent unemployment. The quality of 
previous work experience has also been found to be an important predictor of future work 
status (Schneider, 2000).  
                                                                 
3 See Feather, 1986; Lynd-Stevenson, 1999; Daniels, 1986; O'Brien and Feather, 1990;Leana and Feldman, 1995;Winefield and 
Tiggemann, 1985;  Winefield et al 1993; Kokko et al 2000; De Fruyt and Mervielde, 1999; Bynner, 1998. 
4 See Jayakody, Danziger and Kessler, 1998; Layton and Eysenck, 1985; Lynn, et al 1984; Feather and O'Brien, 1986; De Fruyt and 
Mervielde, 1999; Hammarstroem and Janlert, 1997; Kokko et al 2000; Winefield and Tiggemann, 1985; Daniels, 1986; Capsi et al 
1998; Laub and Sampson, 1994; Kandel and Yamaguchi, 1987; Sanford et al 1994; Woodward and Fergusson, 2000. 
5 See Caspi et al 1998; Lynn et al 1984; Woodward and Fergusson, 2000; Winefield et al 1993; Daniels, 1986; Bynner, 1998.  
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From this research, the picture painted of the youth who is likely to end up unemployed is 
not a happy one. These adolescents are likely to have suffered lives filled with adversities 
such as family problems and a lack of resources, and they are likely to have mental health 
problems, a low opinion of themselves, and poor intellectual ability.   
Fewer studies have investigated the paths of interrelationships between psycho-social 
factors and educational attainment on employment status. Kokko and colleagues (2000) 
found that passive and anxious behaviour measured at age 8 lead to poor educational 
achievement, which then lead to long term unemployment in adulthood. Capsi et al (1998) 
found that a number of social and personal factors affected employment status indirectly 
through the duration of education, but they also had direct effects on employment status. 
Woodward and Fergusson (2000)—in a study especially relevant to New Zealand found 
that childhood peer relationship problems lead to school related difficulties such as early 
school leaving, which then in turn increased the risk of youth unemployment. Thus it 
appears that psycho-social factors may influence future employment status through their 
effect on educational attainment, but that these psycho-social factors can have a direct 
influence on future employment as well. Some research findings have also supported the 
life-course perspective, in that social factors influence personal psychological factors, 
which in turn influence education and employment status. Bynner (1998) found that SES 
influenced the quality of identity development, which in turn predicted future employment 
status. Lynd-Stevenson (1999) found that background factors influenced hopelessness 
about job seeking and attitudes towards working, which in turn predicted future 
employment status. Lynn and colleagues (1984) also found that home background 
influenced a number of psychological variables such as psychoticism, work ethic, and 
intelligence, which in turn all influenced educational attainment, which then predicted 
employment status. However, many of the variables in this study had direct as well as 
indirect effects on employment status.  
Most of the conclusions from this literature are to be expected. Employment prospects are 
better if you come from a high socio-economic status, well-adjusted two-parent family and 
are confident, motivated, intelligent and have good relationships with your peers when you 
are young. Perhaps only the last of these would not readily have been guessed at. These 
factors work on employment prospects both directly and indirectly via achievement in the 
education system. 
The psychological literature reported above focuses on the personality and social 
characteristics that predict unemployment. In the absence of direct research on their links 
with low wages, and with wage mobility, it seems reasonable to suppose that the 
characteristics that predict unemployment will play a role in causing other poor labour 
market outcomes, including low wages.  
Economists have also sought to understand the influence of personal attributes and family 
background on labour market outcomes. The need for comprehensive longitudinal data to 
enable causal relations to be identified has limited the number of studies that have been 
done. An important recent piece of research, Burgess, Garduiner and Propper (2001) 
draw on the US National Longitudinal Survey of youth (specifically, people who were aged 
between 14 and 19 in 1979). They are able to trace their subset for 17 years, to 1996. 
Their objective is to identify the link between family, school and neighbourhood 
characteristics of young people and their subsequent earnings capacity and risk of being 
poor. This is not the same as wage mobility, but, as with the psychological literature, it has 
sufficient family resemblance to be worth reporting (in the absence of more direct 
evidence). The biggest influence on future earnings came from the family, with area 
having little separate effect. The family variables that were significantly positively  
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associated with higher earnings were mother and father’s levels of education. For women, 
fewer siblings lead to higher earnings. For neither sex did coming from a sole parent 
family have a significant impact on future earnings. We note though, that the total 
explanatory power of family variables was low—about 12% of variance for men and about 
9% for women. These findings support the general conclusion of empirical research in 
economics, that low levels of parental education (and in some cases, poverty in 
childhood) have a negative impact on adult earnings (for a review of this evidence, see 
Haveman and Wolfe, 1995). Family background appears to do its work both directly and 
through its impact on educational outcomes. The low explanatory power of the empirical 
estimations suggest that many other factors are at work (or economists have not yet been 
able to capture the impact of family in a fully effective way).  
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11  Is a low wage job better than no job? 
11.1  The impact of no job on the prospects of getting a 
job 
There is a widespread belief, which underlies much of the design of social welfare policy 
in English-speaking countries, that any job is better than no job in terms of future 
prospects for employment and for psychological well-being. For example, the US 
Department of Health and Human Services explains that “Work First programs share a 
common philosophy regarding work: any job is viewed as a good job and program efforts 
should be geared toward helping recipients enter the paid labor force as quickly as 
possible.” (Holcomb, LaDonna Pavetti and Ricdinger 1998:4, quoted by Gottschalk, 
2001:6). The reality is more complex.  
A distinction is often made between unemployment and being not in the labour force 
(inactivity). While the distinction is clear in principle, in practice the line between the two 
states is blurred. Dropping out of the labour force is one response to unemployment, 
especially for young people and for mothers. In 1997, there were as many young males 
who were neither in the labour force nor in education as there were unemployed, in the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the US (Ryan, 2001).  
Non-employment can reduce the probability of getting a job in the next period, or reduce 
the wage of any job offered, if employers believe that it is signaling lack of motivation or 
lack of skills. It might signal the latter if those in the un/non-employment pool are the ones 
that have been rejected by other employers. Unemployment may also have a scarring 
effect, whereby a person’s work productivity is actually damaged by the experience of 
unemployment (through psychological damage and the depreciation of work skills). 
Empirically, it is very difficult to distinguish whether unemployment causes poor labour 
market prospects, or whether people become and stay unemployed because they have 
unobserved low-productivity characteristics. What is clear is that having been unemployed 
reduces the prospects of a young person obtaining subsequent steady work, and most 
probably reduces pay when employment is found. Job loss for the least educated leads to 
lower probabilities of re-employment, higher chances of part-time work and lower earnings 
(Farber, 1999). There is more tentative evidence that unemployment does damage that 
can last a number of years in terms of lower wages and greater employment instability.  
In a careful theoretical and empirical analysis, Stewart (2002) looks directly at the 
comparison between being unemployed and holding a low wage job, on both wages and 
employment one and two years later. He uses UK data from the BHPS, and includes 
people aged 18-65. An interesting dimension of this paper is that Stewart is able to 
identify the impact of each on unemployment and a low wage job, while holding constant a 
range of personal attributes. Two of his conclusions are especially pertinent here. The first 
is that the impact of being unemployed in period 1 on the probability of being unemployed 
in period 2 is not statistically different from the impact of being in a low wage job. In 
coming to this conclusion, he excludes from the analysis people who were continuously 
unemployed over the whole period. The second is that being in a low pay job in period 1 
has a similar impact as being unemployed on the probability of being in a low pay job in 
period 2. Low paid work and unemployment have almost an equally large (negative) 
impact on the probability of moving to a higher paid job, compared to higher paid 
employment. Furthermore, being in a low paid job significantly increases the prospect of  
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being unemployed in the next period, compared with being in a higher paying job. “Low 
paid jobs act as the main conduit for repeat unemployment.” (p 19) On Stewart’s 
evidence, there is little support for the view that any job is better than no job in improving 
prospects for future employment or escape from low wage jobs. The negative effects of 
unemployment on future prospects have been well established (we give some examples 
below). What is new in Stewart’s work is the direct comparison between a spell of 
unemployment and a spell of low wage employment. 
Evidence of the negative effects of unemployment is abundant. However, analyses that 
carefully distinguish the independent effect of a spell of unemployment (state 
dependence) from other causes of unemployment are much less common. Knights, Harris 
and Loundes (2000) is an example for Australia of separate identification of the effects of 
past unemployment on future employment prospects. They use data from the late 1980s, 
drawn from the Australian Longitudinal Survey. They conclude that there is genuine state 
dependence in unemployment. Unlike the work of Stewart, however, they do not compare 
this with the state dependence that arises from employment in a low wage job. 
Less sophisticated studies of the effects of unemployment on future unemployment and 
on low wages are available for a number of European countries. For France,  
. . . the probability that a young worker gains (or holds) regular employment is 
significantly reduced by prior unemployment. At the same time, no further damage 
attaches to employment under fixed-term contracts or participation in labor market 
programs. Similarly, previous unemployment has been found to increase for German 
youth the probability of being unemployed---. For British youth, it increases both the 
probability of entering unemployment and reduces occupational upgrading in early 
working life. For Swedish youth, it reduces pay when employed.---among (British) 
males who leave school early, unemployment reduces occupational status, seven 
years later, only if the relevant spell lasted at least three months. Do the scars fade 
over time? The durability of adverse effects is uncertain. 
Ryan, 2001:48 
Outflows from inactivity are lower than from unemployment. “In some countries, many 
young people shuttle between labor market programs, inactivity, and unemployment, 
accumulating long spells of joblessness but not of unemployment as they go.” (Ryan, 
2001:41).  
From a regression estimate of the causes of variance in the hourly wages earned by 
French youth, Balsan, Hanchane and Werquin (1998: 160-161  conclude that labour 
market history has more impact on women’s than men’s wages.  
Being unemployed or in a market sector youth programme corresponds to the lowest 
wages. -- participation in private sector youth programmes leads to higher wages than 
a spell of unemployment. However, for a given unemployment duration, having 
several spells rather than one results in a lower wage. Apparently, queuing on the 
labour market and searching for a permanent position in the primary sector is more 
efficient from the wage point of view, rather than going through a series of short 
duration jobs.... School-to-work employment schemes help young people get into 
wage earning, “But they might subsequently stay quite a long time in marginal jobs 
which are often characterised by low wages. 
Youth schemes seem to permit better access to jobs, but not to higher wages.   
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11.2  Unemployment, low wage jobs and mental well-being 
The experience of being unemployed and its consequences for future success in the 
labour market will be affected by its psychological impact, as well as by the signal that it 
gives employers. We here report what the psychology (and some economics) literature 
has to say about the consequences of unemployment for mental health, and whether it is 
worse for mental health to be unemployed as compared with being in a low wage, low skill 
job. 
Within the field of psychology, the vast majority of research into employment and 
unemployment has focussed on the psychological consequences of unemployment, rather 
than on the psychological predictors of subsequent employment status (Winefield et al 
1993). Psychologists face the same problem as economists in finding it difficult to 
distinguish causation from selection, when they observe that unemployed people exhibit 
signs of psychological distress: does unemployment cause the distress, or do the 
distressed become unemployed?  
11.2.1 The psychological impact of employment status 
The relationship between employment status and psychological well-being is two-way. 
O'Brien (1986:239) states that “the majority of studies show that unemployment produces, 
in most people, a state of dissatisfaction and distress”. It is widely found that people who 
become unemployed, compared to those who are employed, tend to suffer from damaged 
identity formation, lower self-competence, self-esteem, happiness and life-satisfaction, 
and have higher symptoms of stress and depression.  
In an interesting recent study, Flatau, Galea and Petridis (2000) use large scale Australian 
health surveys to explore the empirical link between unemployment (distinguished by 
duration), part-time employment, non-employment and mental health. Compared with men 
who are in full-time employment, men not in the labour force (and not studying) have the 
worst mental health—worse than those who are unemployed of any duration. The 
negative effect of being out of the labour force is much more muted for women, though 
still apparent. The relation between mental health and unemployment varies by duration of 
unemployment, in a similar way for women and men. Mental health is worst for those 
unemployed for 13-26 weeks and over 52 weeks, by a substantial amount. This suggests 
that there may be adaptations occurring as the duration of unemployment extends. Flatau 
et al show that, controlling for a wide range of socio-demographic attributes and for levels 
of physical health, unemployed men and men employed part-time have lower levels of 
mental health than men employed full-time (aged 18-64). The impact of unemployment is 
diminished, but still statistically significant, if the level of equivalent income of the 
household is controlled for. This suggests that each of the loss of income and the direct 
experience of unemployment have deleterious effects on the mental wellbeing of men. 
The unemployment result, but not the negative effects of part-time employment, applies 
also to women.  
Flatau et al rely on cross-section data, so we cannot be sure that unemployment/part-time 
employment cause rather than are caused by mental illbeing. And they contrast 
unemployment with all full-time employment, not with employment in a low wage job. 
Within the psychological literature, some important comparisons have been made 
between the psychological impact of unemployment and “good” and “bad” employment.  
There are also three psychological theories of employment which implicitly state within 
them the expected psychological impact of employment of different levels of quality.   
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Firstly, Jahoda's (1981, 1982). “Deprivation theory” states that, in addition to its obvious 
function of providing income, employment (even bad employment) has five latent 
functions that are psychologically beneficial and keep us in touch with reality.  
First, it imposes a time structure on the waking day; second, it provides regular social 
contacts with people outside the nuclear family; third, it imposes goals and purposes 
that transcend those of the individual (shared goals); fourth, it defines status and 
identity: and finally, it enforces activity 
Jahoda, 1981:188 
Additionally, Jahoda (1981:189) implies that even bad jobs are preferable to 
unemployment by stating "even unpleasant ties to reality are preferable to their absence".  
In contrast to Jahoda's deprivation theory, Fryer (1986) proposed an “Agency theory”, in 
which the five supposed benefits of employment stated by Jahoda are claimed to often be 
costs of employment rather than benefits. If Fryer is right, bad employment may be 
detrimental to the individual's life satisfaction, perhaps to the point that no job would be 
better than the bad job.  Agency theory stresses the proactive and independent aspects of 
humans, in which people wish to plan for themselves, whereas deprivation theory 
assumes that people are reactive and dependent (Winefield et al 1993).  
The third psychological theory of employment is Warr's (1987) “Vitamin model”, which is 
concerned with the effects of certain environmental features on mental health. Warr 
suggests that nine features of the environment have a curvilinear effect on mental health, 
in an analogous manner to the way vitamins influence physical health. These nine 
features of the environment are: 1) opportunity for control; 2) opportunity for skill use; 3) 
externally generated goals; 4) variety; 5) environmental clarity; 6) money; 7) physical 
security; 8) opportunity for interpersonal contact; and 9) valued social position.  
According to Warr, some of these environmental features act like vitamins A and D, in that 
very high levels of them may not only stop being beneficial, but can be harmful. Others 
resemble vitamins C and E, in that at very high levels they stop being beneficial but are 
not harmful. Warr suggests that three of the environmental features, money, physical 
security and valued social position, are like vitamins C and E, but that the rest are like 
vitamins A and D, and thus can be harmful in high doses. Warr's model does not explicitly 
distinguish between work and non-work environments. Rather, the extent to which any 
environment is beneficial to mental health depends on the extent to which it provides 
these nine environmental features. Therefore, there can be good and bad work 
environments, and good and bad non-work environments. Without suggesting that 
employment is necessarily better than unemployment in terms of these nine features, 
most good jobs provide them at the beneficial levels (Winefield et al 1993). But the vitamin 
model makes it possible in theory for bad employment to be worse for mental health than 
unemployment. 
We note here that social welfare systems clearly and strongly embed the view that 
substantial numbers of people would prefer unemployment to some forms of employment. 
This is implicit in the steps that are taken to ensure that people who receive 
unemployment benefits are “genuinely looking for work”. Active steps are taken by most 
(all?) welfare states to prevent people from choosing unemployment over employment. 
The most dramatic recent example of policy directed to preventing a choice of welfare 
over employment is to be seen in the two-year limits on access to welfare implemented in 
the United States in 1996. Welfare economics, of course, is predicated on the assumption  
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that people know their best interests. Social welfare policy implies that governments 
believe that many people, given the choice, would opt for unemployment over 
employment in the sort of jobs that they may reasonably expect to obtain. If we accept 
these two propositions, it leads us to conclude that for a sizeable proportion of people at 
the low end of the skill distribution, no job (with some welfare income) is better than a poor 
job. 
A more explicitly stated, stronger opinion on bad employment is that of Leim (1992), who 
suggests that, by taking an unsatisfactory job, the worker gives up a sense of personal 
control and incurs damage to his or her sense of self. He claims that the psychological 
costs of accepting an unsatisfactory job are often greater than those incurred by 
remaining unemployed.    
The psychological literature that has investigated this difference between “good” jobs, 
“bad” jobs, and unemployment, has predominantly supported the propositions of Fryer's 
(1986) agency theory and Warr's (1987) vitamin model, in that people in bad employment 
are usually no better off psychologically than those who are unemployed.  
One method of operationalising “good” and “bad” jobs has been to measure the level of 
job satisfaction they provide a worker with.  The sources of job satisfaction are 
challenging and interesting work, having pleasant co-workers, adequate pay and 
opportunities for advancement (Weiten, 1995). These studies have found that 
dissatisfying work environments can lead to subsequent psychological damage (Borgen, 
Amundson and Harder, 1988; Burris, 1983; Landy, Quick and Kasl, 1994). O'Brien and 
Feather (1990) found in a longitudinal study of school leavers that the positive benefits of 
employment for these young people depended upon the quality of employment they had. 
The quality of employment (defined as good or poor) was based on the degree to which 
their job allowed them to utilise their skills and education. School-leavers who obtained 
good quality employment had lower depressive affect, higher life satisfaction, higher 
internal control and higher personal competence than those who were unemployed. 
However, there was little difference on these variables between the unemployed and the 
poorly employed. School leavers who took poor jobs suffered negative effects to their 
psychological functioning, just as those who ended up unemployed. The only—but 
important-- difference was that the poorly employed reported feeling significantly more 
positive about their lives, even though they were similar on the other variables.  
Kaufman (1982) and Leana and Feldman (1995) obtained similar findings in longitudinal 
studies of the quality of re-employment after being laid-off. Kaufman (1982) found that 
unemployed professionals who became re-employed in jobs that did not require a high 
degree of utilisation of the person's ability, knowledge or skills (termed  “underemployed”), 
were no better adjusted than those who remained unemployed. Further, 
underemployment was found to be a highly stressful experience that was comparable to 
unemployment. Leana and Feldman (1995) found those who ended up with unsatisfactory 
employment or underemployment had higher levels of psychological distress and anxiety, 
and lower levels of life satisfaction than those satisfactorily employed, but there was a lack 
of differences between the unsatisfactorily employed and the unemployed. In fact, the 
unsatisfactorily employed reported significantly lower levels of life satisfaction than the 
unemployed, which suggests that a bad job can be worse in one way than unemployment. 
Winefield et al (1993) have found in all the analyses they have conducted since 1984 on a 
sample of school leavers, that those who ended up with jobs that they regarded as 
unsatisfactory, were no better off psychologically than the unemployed. Whereas there 
were no differences between the unsatisfactorily employed and the unemployed on levels  
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of self-esteem, locus of control, depression, negative mood, psychiatric symptoms, 
psychological distress, hopelessness and social alienation, the satisfactorily employed 
(and full-time tertiary students) displayed superior well-being on all of these psychological 
measures.    
It can be concluded that all of these studies consistently suggest that “bad” or 
unsatisfactory employment is no better for a person's psychological well-being than 
having no job at all, which is in line with propositions of Fryer's (1986) and Warr's (1987) 
psychological theories of employment. These findings have important implications for 
government policy and practice. However, the four major longitudinal studies comparing 
“good” and “bad” jobs with unemployment (Kaufman, 1982; Leana and Feldman, 1995; 
O'Brien and Feather, 1990; Winefield et al., 1993), are not able to throw light on the long-
term consequences for psychological well-being of bad jobs in comparison to good jobs 
and unemployment. Winefield et al’s (1993) longitudinal study suggests that people in 
unsatisfactory employment are more likely to enter satisfying employment after one year 
than to remain dissatisfied employed or to end up unemployed. In this study, Winefield et 
al (1993) examined how much stability there was in employment status from one data 
collection point to the next. They found that on average, 55% of those who were 
dissatisfied employed became satisfied employed one year later, and that the satisfied 
employed were the most stable group as 90% remained satisfactorily employed after one 
year. However, about 32% of the dissatisfied employed remained dissatisfied one year 
later, and another 7.4% found themselves unemployed one year later. Thus it appears 
that for about half of the dissatisfied employed, this dissatisfaction is not a long-term, 
stable employment status, which suggests that for these people the negative 
psychological consequences of dissatisfactory employment may be short lived. The 
psychological consequences for the 32% who remain in dissatisfactory employment over 
long periods of time is yet to be determined.    
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12  Does the supply of skills create its own 
demand? 
From a policy perspective, it is crucial to know whether the skills structure of jobs on offer 
from employers is responsive to the availability of skills. If it is not, then it is the structure 
of demand for skills (as it emerges from industry structure and choices of production 
methods) that determines the quantity of high, middle and low paid jobs: it is not the 
quantity of skilled/educated workers. Should  this be the case, an increase in the average 
levels of education will merely lead to more educated workers doing the same jobs as 
were previously done by less educated workers.  
The single most compelling reason for not believing that the supply of skills creates its 
own demand is the juxtaposition of changes in levels of education (equated with skills) 
with changes in inequality of the distribution of earnings. In Canada, the UK, the US, 
Australia and New Zealand, average education levels have been increasing over the past 
two decades. So too has the proportion of the workforce that has completed secondary 
schooling and obtained some post-school qualification. Nonetheless, in all of these 
countries inequality in the distribution of earnings has risen, the real pay of low wage 
earners has fallen and, at least for the US and the UK, mobility from low to higher wages 
has fallen. These trends have been strongest in the US, the country that has the highest 
levels of formal education in the world.  Table 2 shows that education, especially in the US 
and Canada, does not protect people against low wages. Over one third of low wage 
workers in those two countries have post-school education: demand has not arisen to 
meet their supply of skills. These macro facts make it difficult to argue that the solution to 
inequality in earnings and continuing low wage employment is to be found in raising 
average levels of education/skills.  
One concept that can explain this combination of rising average levels of education, a 
reduction in the size of the tail of low education, and rising earnings inequality is 
credentialism. This is allied to the concept of signaling. Both imply that workers’ levels of 
education are used by employers to rank job applicants. The formal qualification may not 
contain any content that is relevant to the job, but it is valued by the employer as a simple 
and inexpensive way of deciding whom to interview among a number of job applicants. On 
this view, formal education signals attributes that the worker already has, such as 
intelligence and persistence, rather than creating new skills. Education then reduces the 
costs of hiring and probably improves the quality of job matches, but it does not 
fundamentally alter the structure of skills available to or demanded by employers. In a 
world of signaling, more education will be profitable for the individual worker. But its 
contribution to the social good will only be through its role in improving the quality of the 
job match. One fact in the US experience that credentialism cannot reconcile, however, is 
that there has been a sharp rise in earnings differences within each educational group 
(eg,  Gottschalk, 1997:33). This is commonly interpreted to mean that some attributes of 
workers that are not easily observed, such as customer skills, motivation and flexibility, 
have become more highly valued by employers. It can also partly be explained by a rise in 
short term fluctuations in people’s earnings. “Jobs were becoming less stable as well as 
less equal.” (Gottschalk, 1997:33). 
In support of the demand-determined view, Blau (1999) argues that “an abundance of 
labor has never spurred employment: the unemployment rate is consistent proof of that.” 
Yet the illusion persists   
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. . .if only the unemployed consisted more rather than less skilled workers, 
unemployment would disappear. This view romanticises why workers get hired. They 
are not hired because they are available; they are hired because employers in the 
private sector believe that the value of their contribution to the business exceeds their 
cost. Nothing in the history of economics suggests that a change in the skills workers 
possess is sufficient to alter this equation. 
Blau, 1999:132 
Prior and Schaffer (1999) show convincingly that in the US the growth of average levels of 
education has caused people with a given level of education to take increasingly lower 
skilled/paid jobs. This has caused a considerable downward occupational mobility at each 
education level. “In brief, university graduates are taking high-school jobs.” (p 3) This has 
been accompanied by a rising joblessness of prime-age males, particularly among the 
less educated, which has persisted even with the strong growth in employment in the 
1990s. The labour market is increasingly sorting workers by their cognitive skills (not just 
education, which is why there is an increasing dispersion of pay within educational 
categories). “Workers experiencing downward occupational mobility generally have lower 
cognitive skills than others with the same educational credentials.” (p 4). 
Prior and Schaffer argue that credentialism is a very important phenomenon, and 
increasing the formal education of some people will not increase total employment, just 
change who has the jobs, making it even harder for those with little formal education. 
They believe bumping down the educational ladder has been a major explanation for the 
fall in wages for those with low education, and the lowest educated (especially men) have 
fallen off the bottom rung into non-employment. Their views are supported by Pigeon and 
Wray (1998), who report that over the course of the 1990s, fewer than 500,000 extra jobs 
in the US were taken by people on the bottom half of the education ladder (ie, no more 
than high school). The 11.3 million other new jobs went to people with at least some 
college education. Many of these jobs were low skilled and could have been done by 
those with only high school education. They also report an interesting survey of employers 
of production labour, asking what they look for when recruiting. The answer is, in order of 
importance, attitude, communication skills, previous work experience, views of co-workers 
and previous employer, industry-based credentials, years of schooling.          (p 207). 
Thus, adding to schooling may not do much, if does not affect attitudes and 
communication skills. This is hard to do if home and neighbourhood are against it. 
The explanation of the rise in inequality of earnings that is based around the idea of 
credentialism is strongly challenged by an alternative school of thought that argues 
instead for the role of skill-biased technological change. In brief, this perspective argues 
that the simultaneous rise in the number of more highly educated workers and the return 
to education (strongly apparent in the US since the mid-1970s) can only be explained by a 
large increase in the demand for highly educated workers. Greater integration of the world 
economy and reduced protections for the working conditions of low wage workers are 
judged to explain part but by no means all of the rise in inequality (or return to education 
and experience). This leaves skill-biased technological change as the remaining major 
candidate to explain the observed facts. In an impressive review of the evidence and 
arguments for the role of skill-biased technological change, Acemoglou (2002) argues that 
it was the dominant influence over the preceding three decades in the US. This view is 
widely shared among American economists (eg, Katz and Autor (1999), Autor, Katz and  
Kreuger (1998)). He goes further to argue that the rise in the rate of skill-biased 
technological change was caused by a sudden expansion of college enrolments in the 
late 1960s, mainly as a way of deferring conscription for the Vietnam war. This view is  
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directly contrary to that of Prior and Schaeffer. It argues that the rapid expansion in 
college level education made it more profitable to develop and introduce technologies that 
required college level skills to utilise them. That is, the expansion of skills did call forth 
demand for those skills.  
While the skill-biased technological change story has much empirical and theoretical 
support, there remain several puzzles. One is that over the relevant period, wages of low 
skill workers fell substantially and the rate of productivity growth was low in the US. 
Another is that other parts of the developed world did not experience the same rise in 
inequality and often had faster rates of growth in productivity, yet faced broadly 
comparable technological frontiers. The final story is yet to be told on the links between 
education, inequality in wages, technological change, globalisation and institutional and 
regulatory changes. In the context on concern about the role of low wage jobs, the key 
question is whether a strategy to increase average levels of education, or the levels of 
education of lower skilled workers, is likely to be effective in improving the employment 
outcomes for those at the bottom of the skill ladder. While there can be no doubt that 
improvement in the level of education of any particular person with low skills will improve 
their job prospects, it is more controversial to assert that the same is true for an increase 
in education for the whole class of low skill workers.  
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13 Conclusions 
To conclude, we provide a brief summary of what has been learned, in terms of each of 
the questions set out in the introduction. 
13.1  The extent to which low pay jobs provide the first 
step on the ladder to reasonably paid and reasonably 
secure jobs for low skill workers 
This is the topic on which the literature provided the most information. It is clear that there 
is indeed substantial upward wage mobility for people who are in low wage jobs. It is also 
clear that the probability of low wage workers moving to higher paid jobs varies over time, 
by country, by age, education, experience, occupation and industry. It also varies 
according to the definition of low wage: the lower the wage, the greater the mobility. This 
is because there is downward as well as upward mobility (many people who lose their 
jobs have to accept lower wages in their next job) and many upward moves are only to a 
slightly higher wage. 
Teenagers employed on or near the minimum wage have high rates of upward wage 
mobility. In contrast, sole mothers and low education adults have quite low levels of 
mobility. For this second group, there is considerable cycling between low wage work, 
unemployment and non-employment. Where there is some wage mobility, it is frequently 
inadequate to lift workers out of poverty. The combination of low wages and part-time or 
part-year employment produces very low annual earnings. 
Countries with lightly regulated labour markets and relatively low levels of employment 
protection (eg,  the US and UK) might be expected to have higher levels of wage mobility 
than countries with more regulated labour markets. In fact this is not so. The US does 
have relatively high levels of job mobility, and low wage workers most commonly have to 
change jobs in order to obtain a wage rise. But the US nonetheless has lower levels of 
wage mobility than do the more regulated European countries. One reason for this is that 
US firms invest less than their European counterparts in skills development of their 
workers on the job. The US and the UK also have relatively high levels of inequality in 
pay. The ability of employers to pay low wages is probably one reason why US firms find it 
profitable to employ workers who have continuing low productivity. A number of the 
European countries place a strong emphasis on the provision of structured pathways from 
initial low wage jobs into better paying jobs, for youth. They also have more generous 
welfare arrangements for people who struggle to find adequately paid employment. For 
these and other reasons, people are less likely to get stuck in continuing low wage 
employment than they are in the US and UK.  
It should be noted that the relatively low levels of upward wage mobility in the US occur in 
a country that has the highest average levels of formal education in the world. More 
education is not necessarily the answer to increasing wage mobility. It matters who gets 
this education (the US does relatively well for the more able, and relatively badly for the 
less able). The role of firms in providing skills development is also important, as are 
institutional structures to encourage pathways to better jobs. The reader should be aware 
that the evidence of relative wage mobility mostly does not extend beyond the mid-1990s. 
A strong macro-economy, as experienced in the US and UK in the latter 1990s, is some  
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help to upward wage mobility. Offsetting this, the literature identifies a substantial trend 
towards declining mobility as inequality in the cross-section wage distribution has risen.  
We conclude from this review of the literature that low wage jobs are an important entry 
point for young people as they first become established in the labour market. For the large 
majority of these young people, the low wage jobs are temporary, and can indeed be seen 
as the first foot on the ladder. For a minority of young people, the size of which varies 
across countries, initial low wage jobs do not lead on to better things, but rather to a 
cycling between low wage employment, unemployment and non-employment. The social 
and economic institutions for assisting the transition from school to work are important for 
this minority. 
This generally sanguine view of the role of low wage jobs does not apply to older workers. 
For older workers who are sole mothers, have lost their previous job, or who have lower 
levels of education, low wage jobs often do not lead anywhere. Many are inherently low 
skilled and are not associated with promotional ladders (truck drivers, cashiers, nurse, 
child care and teachers aides, cleaners etc). Note that, although the pattern varies a little 
across countries, the typical full-time low wage worker is a woman aged 25-55 who has 
basic or upper secondary education. Only in Germany were a majority of low wage 
workers aged under 25 (in the US, 80% are over 24). Thus the high wage mobility 
observed for low wage youth is of little comfort to the majority of low wage workers. In 
Australia and New Zealand, a majority of full-time low wage workers are men. And in the 
US, more than one third have post-school qualifications.  
13.2  Which types of low paid jobs provide the best / worst 
chances of upward mobility? 
Low wage jobs are concentrated in particular occupations and industries. They are 
prevalent in service industry jobs that broadly replicate in the market the sort of activities 
that were once done by women in the home. These include child care, elder care, non-
qualified nursing care, cleaning, food preparation and serving. These types of jobs are not 
part of any sort of career path and workers in them can expect a pay rise only if they move 
to some different job/industry. Truck driving and labouring are comparable jobs for men.  
The industries in which the low wage jobs are predominantly found are similar across 
countries. They include retail, hospitality, personal services and business services. Firms 
in the entertainment, recreation, mining and personal services industries were found to 
provide virtually no increase in wages based on tenure in the firm, in the US. There is 
evidence that some firms operate a high turnover, low wage policy, which discourages 
both firm and worker from investing in skills related to the job. Indeed, high turnover 
industries/firms are likely to provide poor opportunities for upward wage mobility. First, 
high turnover discourages investment in skills. Second, workers who lose their jobs 
systematically are forced to accept lower wages in their replacement job. Indeed, the 
wage loss from involuntary job change often lasts for many years, if not the rest of the 
working life. 
Small firms in the private sector were found to by systematically linked with low 
propensities for wage gains for their low wage workers.  
The conditions that are conducive to wage growth for a low wage worker, in their current 
job, are employment in a large, profitable, low turnover firm that operates in industries 
other than retail, hospitality or personal services. Public sector employment is in most  
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cases a relatively high wage employer of low skill people and provides relatively large 
amounts of on the job training. 
The circumstances facing low skill workers, especially in the main English-speaking 
countries, has become increasingly challenging in the past three decades. The best 
evidence to date concludes that technological change, which has probably accelerated, 
has particularly favoured high skill workers (ie, those with high levels of formal education 
and workforce experience). It has also favoured particular personal attributes, such as 
cognitive ability and interpersonal skills, that are not readily acquired. These impacts of 
technological change on the shape of the demand for skills has been reinforced by 
increased international integration of the economy and changes in the pattern of demand 
away from manufactured goods towards services. The protections provided to lower paid 
workers through unions, regulated conditions of employment and high levels of public 
sector employment have been diminished by sustained public policy actions, especially in 
the English-speaking world. The shift towards services (which cannot be stored) and the 
increased levels of competition in product markets have caused firms to move more 
towards part-time, casual and contract (just-in-time) labour. Workers employed on such 
terms systematically receive less on the job training than do full-time permanent workers, 
for easily understood reasons.  
People have responded to the increased premium for skills by acquiring ever-increasing 
levels of formal education. One likely consequence is that the group who do not follow this 
path is increasingly perceived to be of low quality. The absence of much education is 
easily taken to indicate poor employability. Why would a person “choose” not to go on with 
their education unless there was something seriously wrong with them? 
Changes in the structure of industry in the turbulent decades since the early 1970s have 
led to the obsolescence of skills for workers in the declining industries. One clear example 
is men working in manufacturing. Strong evidence was cited that showed that job loss in 
these circumstances results in large losses in wages that endure for many years, if it is 
possible to find a job at all. The rising withdrawal of adult men from the labour force 
suggests that many do not find another job. The industries that have been growing in this 
structural change (retail, hospitality, personal services) are ones that offer relatively little 
on the job training and career paths.  
Overall, the economic dynamics of recent decades have provided exciting opportunities 
for able, well-educated workers from favourable family backgrounds. But they have made 
it harder for less able, low-education workers from unfavourable family backgrounds to 
identify and follow pathways to satisfactory employment. Many face insecure, part-time, 
low paid employment in small firms that offer little skills development.  
13.3  Is a low paid, insecure job better than no job? 
This interesting and policy-relevant question has several answers, which depend on the 
meaning given to “better”. 
If “better” means that a person has a higher chance of being employed in the next period, 
then the answer is that a bad job is probably better than no job, but only modestly so. A 
number of studies show that movement from unemployment into a job is difficult, the more 
so the longer the duration of the unemployment. Indeed, theory, with some empirical 
support, concludes that the chances of a low skilled person moving straight from non-
employment into a reasonably good job (especially one with prospects for wage growth) 
are small. The best prospects for a low skilled person to find a reasonable job come from  
WP 02/29 |  LOW WAGE JOBS AND PATHWAYS TO BETTER OUTCOMES  70  
securing a good match – that is, a job that makes the most of their abilities. It often takes 
a willingness to move from job to job before a good match is found.  
The direct evidence that a bad job is better than no job in terms of securing higher pay is 
weak. A complete investigation of this question would require careful specification of the 
alternative to employment. For relatively low skill youth, evidence was cited that job 
programs do increase the chances of getting a regular job, but do little for wages. The 
most sophisticated examination of this question concluded that employment in a low wage 
job provides no statistically significant advantage over an episode of unemployment in the 
search for a higher paying job. 
If “better” means better for mental well-being, then the evidence does not support the view 
that any job is better than no job. The low income associated with being unemployed is a 
major source of the distress caused by unemployment. But the overwhelming evidence 
from a number of longitudinal studies by psychologists is that being employed in a poor 
job does not lead to better mental well-being than being unemployed, once the effects of 
any income difference are accounted for. 
13.4  Do the costs of geographical mobility and broken 
employment histories inhibit wage mobility and why? 
We do not report any direct evidence on the impact of the costs of within country 
geographical mobility on wage profiles. There is a considerable literature on both 
international and internal migration. This literature makes the obvious point that people 
who migrate for economic reasons must believe that the expected earnings in the new 
destination will exceed the expected earnings in the current location by an amount 
sufficient to cover the costs of migrating (including the psychological costs). The expected 
earnings in each case will be a product of the probability of finding a job and the expected 
wage in that job (plus any welfare available to cover periods of non-employment). An 
increase in the costs of moving will increase the degree of self-selection among potential 
migrants, in favour of those with larger expected gains. The costs of moving will be higher 
for risk averse people if there is uncertainty about potential wage offers in the labour 
market to which the migrant might move. One policy response that encourages migration 
among people who should benefit, is to provide high quality information about the 
destination labour market. Good job-matching services would play a similar role. Home 
ownership in declining regions has a well-documented negative effect on the propensity to 
shift to find a better, or any, job. The obvious reason is the capital loss involved in selling 
the home into a depressed housing market. 
13.5  Does the supply of low skilled/high skilled workers 
affect the demand for low skilled/high skilled 
workers? 
The link between the supply of and demand for different types of skills and skill structure 
is complex, two-way and likely to differ over the long-term as compared with the short 
term. There is a clear interaction between the supply of and demand for skills via the price 
mechanism. The wages for specific types of skills (geologists, IT specialists, accountants, 
bricklayers, for example) clearly are responsive to shifts in the state of excess demand or 
supply for those skills. Changes in relative wages in turn induce a response in the supply 
and/or demand. But this is not the issue that underlies the bigger question. Rather, the 
issue is, if low skilled people generally were given more education or other forms of skill  
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development, would this call forth a greater demand for their new skills? Or would it 
merely mean that they would be over qualified for whatever jobs they were able to get? 
And would it mean that those who did not get the extra skills would have virtually no 
chance of employment, being displaced by those higher up the education ladder than 
themselves? 
The reality is likely to be somewhere between these extremes of full response of demand 
and no response. But on the US evidence, the balance appears closer to no response. 
The very high levels of average education, and the large proportion of the US workforce 
that has completed secondary school and that has tertiary qualifications has not 
prevented the large scale growth of low wage, low skill jobs. It has had two rather 
disturbing outcomes. One is that people who do not have substantial levels of formal 
education have little hope of finding satisfactory employment. The absence of completed 
secondary school education is taken as a strong signal of poor employability. The other is 
that many people are over qualified for the work that they do. That this over qualification 
does not translate into greater prospects for upward wage mobility, is suggested by the 
relatively low levels of mobility in the US compared with a number of European countries. 
13.6 Do different causes of low skill (low education, poor 
schooling or parenting, history on welfare, crime, 
drug dependence etc) affect future labour market 
outcomes? 
Psychologists have the best evidence on this question. Numerous studies have identified 
the personal and background characteristics of people who have poor labour market 
outcomes (mostly in the form of unemployment, rather than low wage jobs).  
Economists have observed that the rising inequality of wages in the English-speaking 
world has occurred within demographic and education groups. That is, people with the 
same sex, experience, education, race and even occupation are increasingly being paid 
different levels of wages. This has been interpreted to mean that non-observable personal 
characteristics, such as motivation and general ability, are being increasingly rewarded in 
the market place. It must be admitted that the direct evidence for this proposition is 
modest: it is more an inference than an observation. 
The psychological literature is able to identify a range of personal and environmental 
factors that are detrimental to good employment outcomes. While there is no direct link 
between these factors and wage mobility, it is a reasonable supposition that the factors 
that are associated with unemployment, intermittent employment and low wages also 
contribute to low prospects of obtaining good wages in the future.  These factors have 
direct effects and also effects through their impact on levels of education attained. 
Minority ethnicity youth from lower socio-economic status backgrounds who attended 
public schools are at higher risk for subsequent unemployment. So too are those growing 
up in a single parent family; with parents who have lower status occupation and 
qualifications; and with unemployment in the family. Peer relationship problems stemming 
back into childhood are also predictors of youth unemployment. Young people with the 
worst labour market prospects not only have family problems and a lack of resources, 
they are likely also to have mental health problems, a low opinion of themselves, and poor 
intellectual ability.   
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Among adults, sole mothers have particular difficulty in moving upward into satisfactory 
jobs. While for some a low education may be part of the dynamic, no doubt also the need 
to find time and energy to care for their young children, and an alternative of even modest 
welfare support, also contribute. There is strong evidence from the US, and some from 
other English-speaking countries, including Australia, that sole mothers cycle between low 
paid insecure jobs, having a partner who will support them, and reliance on welfare 
payments.  
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14  Policies for wage mobility 
The following picture of wage mobility for low wage workers has emerged from this review 
of the literature. 
Low wage workers are a heterogeneous group, though they are likely to have relatively 
low levels of formal education. Their best chance of getting a higher wage is to move from 
a low paid job to a better job. Better jobs are most frequently found in expanding 
industries, in the public sector and with large employers. They may do this directly by 
moving to a job that is a better match with their abilities and interests. Or they could, if 
their current job/employer makes this possible, learn new skills in their current job. If their 
current job does not provide an opportunity for skills development (and many low wage 
jobs do not), then their only prospect for improvement is through taking formal courses off 
the job.  
There are several policies that could improve the prospects for wage mobility of low wage 
workers.  
First, young, reasonably educated workers are very likely to be able to manage their own 
path upward, using a combination of formal job search, personal networks and on and off 
the job skills development. The more educated they are, the more employers are likely to 
invest in their further skills development. Therefore, scarce policy and revenue resources 
should probably be focussed on other groups within the low wage workforce. The two 
main ones are youth with low levels of formal education, and older workers, especially 
sole mothers and displaced workers. 
There is a dilemma, or perhaps an opportunity, for policy, that arises from the link 
between job mobility and firm-provided training. On the one hand, the empirical evidence 
is that low wage workers are most likely to obtain a wage increase by moving voluntarily 
to another job - indeed, to another industry. On the other hand, high levels of quits inhibit 
firms from providing on-the-job training.  
Policy to facilitate high levels of job mobility will benefit those low wage workers able to 
move to higher paying jobs. However, it will reduce the opportunities for low wage workers 
to acquire higher skills from their current employer. In brief, a high mobility policy will 
encourage wage mobility through more efficient job matching. But it will discourage wage 
mobility through increased skills learned on the job. This suggests that if a high mobility 
policy strategy is pursued, careful attention should be paid to the provision of financial or 
other incentives to firms to provide training for their lower skilled workers. Alternatively, if 
firm-provided training is encouraged by policies that diminish worker turnover, then ways 
to obtain the benefits of effective job matching must be devised. 
Firms left to themselves are unlikely to provide satisfactory levels of training for low 
education youth (recall (a) Freeman’s conclusion that “considerable institutional structure 
is needed to induce firms to provide training to workers.” (1995: 7)) and (b) that 70% of 
people in the US with less than high school education experienced a fall in their real wage 
if they stayed in the same job (Gottschalk (2001)). Further, such youth are not very likely 
to benefit from off-the-job classroom instruction, since they have already signaled that 
formal classroom education is not a good environment for them. Unemployment and non-
employment for this group is clearly damaging to their future prospects. This suggests that 
low education young people need to be provided with jobs that contain real skills  
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development. This could be achieved through inducements to firms to provide 
employment in jobs that have scope for learning, and supervision and encouragement to 
learn. Larger firms are probably better in this regard than smaller ones, especially if they 
are in growing industries. Policy must confront the fact that most low wage jobs are with 
small employers, and small employers systematically provide less on the job training than 
do large employers. Learning could usefully be complemented with related off-the-job 
instruction. One advantage of some instruction off the job is that it will be less firm-specific 
and hence will contribute to wage mobility through facilitating movement to another job. 
There is an argument for some apprentice type arrangement, whereby both the firm and 
the employee have obligations and contribute to the cost of the skills development—the 
employee via accepting a lower wage. The main drawback of relying on firms for skills 
development is that both the employment side and the learning side of the arrangement 
must be satisfactory to both parties in order to obtain the desired outcome. It is likely to be 
beneficial to have mediators who assist in keeping both sides of the relationship running 
smoothly. In the US there are signs of the emergence of private “career managers” who 
take on the role of mediator and put together job and training packages for individuals (for 
a fee): (see Zemsky, 1998). Off-the-job components of the training package could be 
privately supplied, but this may make them beyond the reach of low wage workers who 
are already accepting a training wage. There is a strong case for public subsidy, and 
perhaps provision, of such training. There could be scope for an income-contingent fee, if 
the costs of the training are large enough to justify the administrative costs. It may also be 
necessary to work through many channels to develop a culture within firms of training and 
support for low education youth.  
The strategy for young people may be suitable also for older low wage workers. With the 
older workers, however, the disenchantment with the formal education system may be 
more muted. This would make the conventional route to higher wages, via formal 
education qualifications, a complementary strategy. The policy issue is how to finance the 
time out necessary for study. Adult time is more expensive than youth time, in part 
because adults are likely to have obligations to children and perhaps to a mortgage. 
Flexible delivery of courses provides an opportunity for adults to learn at times of the week 
where their time has least alternative value. 
In the end, training and learning is beneficial only if there are jobs available that will use 
the newly acquired skills. The decisions that firms make about the skill mix and turnover 
properties they look for in their workforces has immense social significance. It is clear 
from theory and from the US and UK experiences, that left to themselves many firms will 
adopt the low wage, low training, high turnover strategy. Recall that about 15% of high 
education workers in the Netherlands, Germany, France and the UK had low wages: 
further evidence that supply does not necessarily generate its own demand. The outcome 
is high levels of wage inequality and of poverty, and low prospects for upward wage 
mobility among many, especially older, low wage workers. A skills development strategy 
on the supply side needs to be matched with policies to induce firms to recognise the 
social interest in the quality and character of jobs on offer. This may need to be 
complemented by some form of job creation subsidies and job destruction taxes. 
The evidence from the psychologists that identifiable groups of people are most at risk of 
being stuck in a pattern of low wage/no wage jobs provides an opportunity for positive 
public policy. Clearly, governments cannot ensure that all people reach adulthood 
confident, motivated, intelligent, highly educated and with good peer relationships. But it 
can recognise that the prospects of being able to carve out an adequate adult worklife for 
oneself vary a great deal and that some at least of that variation is not reasonably seen as 
self-inflicted. One response could be to offer intensive assistance to people who come  
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from the most unpropitious backgrounds. This is in contrast to a welfare system that treats 
everyone equally. The Jobs Network in Australia provides an example of how such a 
mechanism for intensive assistance might work. There, private employment agencies are 
paid a capitation fee by the Government for each unemployed person for whom they find 
a job. The capitation fee is varied, depending on the assessed difficulty of finding a job for 
such a person. People who are assessed to be particularly difficult to employ (such as the 
long-term unemployed) carry the greatest capitation fee, and a requirement that they be 
given intensive assistance before the fee will be paid. 
A second response could be to provide particular support for the transition from school to 
work for young people who face unpromising prospects. The transition from school to 
work is reasonably smooth for the majority of young people. But in an increasingly 
complex world, it is a difficult and sometimes unsuccessful project for some. Tailored 
assistance in finding and keeping work, and finding and completing relevant training, 
could be targeted to those whom the research shows are likely to have the greatest 
difficulty in managing the transition on their own.  
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